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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-FEDEAL COURT OF APPEALS
VACATES SENTENCE ON GROUNDS OF SEVERITY AND REMANDS TO
DISTRICT COURT FOR RESENTENxciIG
Defendant and four others were convicted 1 of possessing goods stolen
from interstate commerce. Defendant, having elected to stand trial despite
his co-felons' pleas of guilty, was sentenced to three years' imprisonment
even though he had no previous record, 2 had been married for twelve years
and steadily employed for five, and was characterized by the trial judge
as a "minor participant" in the crime. The "ring-leader," who had four
previous convictions, received two years' imprisonment, and the other minor
participants were each sentenced to a year and a day.3 The defendant's
motion for a probation hearing was denied on the grounds that by pleading
not guilty he had-according to the trial judge's "standing policy"-dis-
qualified himself from probation. The Seventh Circuit held that the denial
of a probation hearing was error and remanded the case.4 In addition, the
court noted the disparity between the severe sentence received by the de-
fendant and those imposed upon his co-felons. Conducting the hearing as
required, the district court denied probation and reimposed the original
sentence. On a second appeal, the court of appeals, though holding that
denial of probation was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion, set aside
the three-year penalty and remanded the case to the district court with direc-
tions to reduce the sentence. United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th
Cir. 1960).
Since 1917 the federal courts of appeals have universally refused to
review sentences that are within statutory limits.5 Although some courts
1 Under 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1958).
2 Defendant had been placed on probation for a juvenile offense, but the United
States attorney informed the trial court that defendant had no prior criminal record.
United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500, 502 n.1, 503 (7th Cir. 1960).
3 There is no minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1958). The maximum is
a $5,000 fine, or ten years imprisonment, or both.
4 United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959). But cf. Williams v.
United States, 273 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1959) (per curiam).
5 E.g., United States v. De Marie, 261 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1959) ; United States
v. Kapsalis, 214 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838, petition for rehearing denied, 344 U.S. 889
(1952), stay granted by Douglas, J., vacated, 346 U.S. 273 (1953); Gurera v. United
States, 40 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1930); Freeman v. United States, 243 Fed. 353 (9th
Cir. 1917). But see Scott v. United States, 165 Fed. 172 (5th Cir. 1908) (per
curiam), where the court, while affirming the conviction, with the government's
consent vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. In dictum the court
stated, "perhaps we could grant..." the vacating of the sentence without the
government's consent.
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have alluded to the possibility of exceptions to the nonreview rule,6 and
others have denied review stating that there was no showing that the dis-
trict court abused its discretion, 7 the overwhelming weight of authority
states that the courts of appeals have no power to review sentences which
are within the legal limits.8 While there has been no Supreme Court
holding on point, Court dicta tend to support the view that, where there
is a statutory limit on sentencing, sentences within that limit-though severe
-are not reviewable.9  Prior to 1891, the old circuit courts reviewed
sentences on appeal,' following the statutory prescription that when affirm-
ing a conviction they "proceed to pronounce final sentence . . . 11 This
language was not retained in the Act of 1891 which created the courts of
appeals ' 2 and, in Freeman v. United States,13 the Ninth Circuit-ignoring
a Supreme Court holding that the powers given to the federal appellate
courts by previous legislation were incorporated in the Act of 1891 14
6 United States v. Lo Duca, 274 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1960) (per curiam);
United States v. De Marie, 261 F.2d 477, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1959); Smith v. United
States, 3 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1925) (memorandum decision); Goldberg v. United
States, 277 Fed. 211, 220 (8th Cir. 1921).
7 United States v. Frank, 245 F.2d 284, 288 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
819 (1957) ; United States v. Cosentino, 191 F.2d 574, 575 (7th Cir. 1951) ; Peterson
v. United States, 246 Fed. 118 (4th Cir. 1917) ; Wallace v. United States, 243 Fed.
300 (7th Cir. 1917); cf. Kopp v. United States, 55 F.2d 878, 879 (7th Cir. 1932)
(trial court sentences within its "sound discretion"). In United States v. De Marie,
supra note 6, at 479-80, the court stated: "On a record such as this one this court
has no control over a sentence which is within the limits allowed by the statute."
See also United States v. Sorcey, 151 F.2d 899, 902-03 (7th Cir. 1945).
8 E.g., United States v. Kapsalis, 214 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1954); United States
v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Beckett v. United States, 84 F.2d 731 (6th
Cir. 1936) ; Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1930) ; Bailey v. United
States, 284 Fed. 126 (7th Cir. 1922) ; Voege v. United States, 270 Fed. 219 (2d Cir.
1920) (per curiam).
9 See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958); Rosenberg v. United
States, 344 U.S. 889 (1952) (memorandum of Frankfurter, J., on denial of rehearing) ;
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305 (1931). Gore and Blockburger
both concern cumulative sentencing for narcotics violations, an area in which Congress
has shown it wants stiff penalties.
10 United States v. Wynn, 11 Fed. 57 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1882); Bates v. United
States, 10 Fed. 92 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1881).
11 Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 176, § 3, 20 Stat. 354.
12 Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
13 243 Fed. 353 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 600 (1919). This holding
was compelled by neither the language of the act nor statutory history. Sections 4
and 6 of the Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 827, 828, created in the new
courts of appeals the former appellate jurisdiction of the old circuit courts. Section 11,
ch. 517, 26 Stat. 829 (1891), states that "all provisions of law now in force regulating
the method and systems of review . . . shall regulate the methods and system of
appeals and writs of error provided for in this act in respect of the circuit courts
of appeal . . . ." The report of the House Judiciary Committee states that the
bill "destroys the 'judicial despotism' of the present system by creating an inter-
mediate appellate court, with power to reverse the final judgments of the district
courts in all cases, civil and criminal . . . ." H.R. REP. No. 1295, 51st Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1890). Although the original House bill was amended in the Senate to
permit the continued existence of the old circuit courts as courts of original juris-
diction, the basic aims of the legislation remained.
14 Ballew v. United States, 160 U.S. 187, 201-02 (1895). This case was followed
by the Second Circuit in Hanley v. United States, 123 Fed. 849 (2d Cir. 1903), cert.
denied, 194 U.S. 634 (1904). See also Scott v. United States, 165 Fed. 172 (5th Cir.
1961]
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held that the language omission had deprived it of the power of sentence
review. In so holding, the Freeman court also disregarded section 2106
of the Judiciary Code empowering federal appellate courts to "affirm,
modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order . . ."
of a lower court.15 Similarly worded statutes have been held by state
courts to embrace the power of appellate review of sentences,' 6 but no
federal court has so interpreted section 2106.17 Without citing that section,
the Supreme Court has reviewed sentences imposed in criminal contempt
cases,18 and this apparent exception has been rationalized on the ground
that there is no statutory limit on sentences for contempt.' 9 While sug-
gesting that disregard of section 2106 with respect to sentencing may be
erroneous, two courts of appeals have stated that the absolute nonreview
rule is now so well established that only the Supreme Court could reverse
it.20 But the rule was not laid down by the Supreme Court; it is a restraint
created by the courts of appeals, and, if grounded in poor policy and not
compelled by reasoned authority, may be abandoned by those courts
themselves.
The Seventh Circuit does not mention the great weight of authority
against appellate review of sentencing.2 ' It bases its power to act not on
1908), where the court cited United States v. Wynn, 11 Fed. 57 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1882),
and Bates v. United States, 10 Fed. 92 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1881), to support its dictum
that the courts of appeals "perhaps" have the power of sentence review.
1528 U.S.C. §2106 (1958). A similar provision was in effect for the federal
appellate courts by Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 2, 17 Stat. 197, and was made
effective to the courts of appeals by Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 11, 26 Stat. 829.
See United States ex re. John Davis Co. v. Illinois Sur. Co., 226 Fed. 653, 664 (7th
Cir. 1915), aff'd, 244 U.S. 376 (1917) ; revisor's notes following CoMnna STATuTEs
OF THE UNiED STATEs 1913, tit. 13, ch. 18, § 1669. The possible relevance of § 2106
to sentence review has been pointed out. Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462, 467
(10th Cir. 1959) (dictum) ; id. at 468-69 (separate opinion) ; United States v. Rosen-
berg, 195 F2d 583, 605 (2d Cir. 1952) (opinion of Frank, J.) (dictum). Cf. Berman
v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937): "[In a criminal case] the sentence is
the judgment."
16PARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-2144 (1947), Williams v. State, 183 Ark. 870, 39
S.W.2d 295 (1931) ; IDAHo CODE ANN. § 19-2821 (1947), State v. Ramirez, 34 Idaho
623, 203 Pac. 279 (1921); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1066 (1958), Fritz v. State,
8 Okla. Crim. 342, 128 Pac. 170 (1912) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 41 (1930), Com-
monwealth v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 AtI. 733 (1932).
17 See Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462, 467 (10th Cir. 1959); United
States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 605 (2d Cir. 1952) (opinion of Frank, J.).
Equally true, no federal appellate court has held that § 2106 does not embrace sen-
tence review. Smith v. United States, supra at 468-69 (separate opinion).
18 Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363 (1958) (per curiam) ; United States v.
UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 304 (1947) ; cf. Rosenfeld v. United States, 167 F.2d 222 (4th
Cir. 1948) (court of appeals revised a contempt sentence).
19 See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188 (1958) ; United States v. Rosen-
berg, 195 F.2d 583, 605 n.25 (2d Cir. 1952). Insofar as Yates v. United States, supra
note 18, was a contempt case, the court in the instant case was in error in using it
as authority. But see note 25 infra. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1958) states that "a court of
the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its dis-
cretion, such contempt of its authority . ...
20 Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462, 468 (10th Cir. 1959) ; United States v.
Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 605-07 (2d Cir. 1952). But see Smith v. United States,
supra at 468-69 (separate opinion).
21 The Seventh Circuit has been consistent in denying review. E.g., United
States v. De Marie, 261 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1959); United States v. Kapsalis, 214
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section 2106 or a reinterpretation of the Act of 1891, but rather on its
supervisory control of the district court. In La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.,
22
cited in the opinion, the Supreme Court recognized that the courts of
appeals have, under exceptional circumstances, supervisory control over
the district courts. However, this supervisory power is but an aid to
the court's acknowledged appellate functions; it is not an independent
power, but one ancillary to ends that are within the appellate power.2
If the courts of appeals lack the appellate power to review sentences, they
cannot surreptitiously do so by means of their supervisory power.24 But
while the Seventh Circuit's action cannot, therefore, be properly based on
its supervisory power, the decision can still be rationalized as an exception
to, rather than a conflict with, the absolute rule of nonreview.2 5  The re-
versible error in Wiley is not the severity 
20 nor even the disparity 2 7 of
F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Cosentino, 191 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1951) ;
United States v. Sorcey, 151 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1945); Bailey v. United States,
284 Fed. 126 (7th Cir. 1922). However, the language of recent cases is confusing.
In Cosentino the court did not speak in absolutes as it had in Bailey, and apparently
adopted an abuse of discretion rule. But it ignored Cosentino when it again spoke
in absolutes in Kapsalis. In United States v. De Marie, the latest case before Wiley,
the court stated: "On a record such as this" there could be no review of the sentence.
261 F.2d at 480. Perhaps, this statement meant that again the court was retreating
from the absolute rule. In Wiley the court mentioned none of these precedents.
22 352 U.S. 249, 259 (1957) (mandamus to district court to vacate appointment
of referee in antitrust action); cf. Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363 (1958);
Walling v. James V. Renter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 676 (1944); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943) ; Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551,
555 (1940); Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600, 607 (1935); Oklahoma Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Oklahoma Packing Co., 292 U.S. 386, 392 (1934); Gully v. Interstate
Natural Gas Co., 292 U.S. 16, 18 (1934) (per curiam).
23 See Minnesota v. National Tea Co., supra note 22.
24In La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957), the Supreme Court
stated: "Since the Court of Appeals could at some stage of the antitrust proceedings
entertain appeals in these cases, it has power in proper circumstances, as here, to
issue writs of mandamus reaching them." Id. at 255. In Walling v. James V.
Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 676 (1944), in aid of its power to review federal questions
decided by state courts, the Court vacated a state court judgment, so that in a new
judgment the state court could disentangle the federal and state issues. Cf. McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943) ; Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600,
607 (1935); Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Oklahoma Packing Co., 292 U.S. 386,
392 (1934). In Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363 (1958), the Court, acting
pursuant to its acknowledged power to review contempt sentences, see text accom-
panying note 18 supra, did not vacate the sentence but rather modified it itself because
of the recalcitrance of the lower court. See note 25 infra.
25 See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit cites none of
these cases alluding to possible exceptions to the absolute rule. It bases its entire
argument on its "supervisory power." This lack of analysis should not, however,
detract from the significance of the court's result. Further justification for the court's
"exception' is the fact that the district court ignored the appellate court's clear wish
as expressed in the first appeal. Cf. Yates v. United States, supra note 24.
26 In United States v. Sorcey, 151 F.2d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 1945), the court stated:
"In such a situation [sentence within statutory limits] we may not disturb a judg-
ment fixing such penalties because only of the seeming severity of the sentence."
27In United States v. De Marie, 261 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1959), the appellant
was sentenced to ten years for narcotics violations while his co-felon, whom new
evidence showed to have been the principal culprit, received two years. The court
rejected sentence disparity as a basis for sentence reversal.
19611
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the sentence, but rather its basis.28  Thus the case is distinguishable from
the Supreme Court dicta cases,2 9 the courts of appeals decisions denying
review while suggesting the possibility of exceptions, 30 and virtually all
those cases which uphold the absolute nonreview rule: 31 in Wiley, as the
court viewed the case, the basis of sentencing was the defendant's plea of
guilty.3 2 And to condone sentencing on this basis would be to undermine,
by discouraging its exercise, a fundamental right of an accused-the right
to trial by jury.33 No case more properly reviewable could have been
hypothesized by those courts which have spoken of abuse of the sentencing
court's discretion 3 4 or which have alluded to possible exceptions to the
absolute rule of nonreviewability.3 5
28 Cf. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948). In holding that state
denial of counsel to an indigent defendant in sentencing procedure was a violation of
due process where the defendant was prejudiced thereby, the Court stated: "We would
make clear that we are not reaching this result because of petitioner's allegation
that his sentence was unduly severe . . . . It is not the duration or severity of
this sentence that renders it constitutionally invalid; it is the careless or designed
pronouncement of sentence on a foundation so extensively and materially false, which
the prisoner had no opportunity to correct by the services which counsel would pro-
vide, that renders the proceedings lacking in due process." But see Bailey v. United
States, 284 Fed. 126, 127 (7th Cir. 1922) (dictum).
29 See cases cited note 9 spra.
30 See cases cited notes 6-7 supra.
31 See cases cited note 8 supra. In only two cases were the courts of appeals
faced with sentences that the record, or surrounding factors, apparently showed to
be based on improper considerations: Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 469 (10th
Cir. 1959) (per curiam); Beckett v. United States, 84 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1936).
In Williams the defendant's continued protestations of his innocence after conviction
were the basis of denial of probation; in Beckett there were the possibilities that racial
prejudice and the trial judge's feeling that the defendants had committed perjury
had influenced the sentencing. In neither of these cases did the improper basis of
sentencing appear as indisputable to the court of appeals as in Wiley. In Willianu
the court seemed equivocal as to the impropriety of denying probation on the district
court's criterion. The Beckett court was primarily concerned with cumulative sen-
tencing, which it found to be a closed question. The possible racial prejudice was
not in the record and had to be assumed by the appellate court The court did not
consider the trial judge's feeling that the defendants had committed perjury an un-
proper sentencing consideration. See also Peterson v. United States, 246 Fed. 118
(4th Cir. 1917).
32 The court notes in its opinion that there was no evidence that the defense was
frivolous or in bad faith. It does not seem desirable, however, in such an important
area of constitutional guarantees as that of trial by jury to have the appellate court
determine the motives of the defendant in pleading not guilty.
33 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. Cf. Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th
Cir. 1957), where a conviction based on a guilty plea of unrepresented defendants
after the trial judge had indicated that a lighter sentence would be imposed on a
plea of guilty than on one of not guilty was held to violate due process of law. In
the instant case the defendant waived a jury and was tried by the court. This con-
cession to expediency may have produced a lighter sentence than if the defendant had
not waived the jury. See United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453, 458 (7th Cir. 1959)
(separate opinion). It is not contended that sentences are not in fact influenced by
whether or not the accused has pleaded guilty. See Euziere v. United States, supra;
Helms v. Humphrey, 63 F. Supp. 4 (D. Minn. 1945); People v. Gilbert, 25 Cal. 2d
422, 154 P.2d 657 (1944). This, however, would not justify an appellate court's
ignoring the improper procedure when it is blatantly apparent in the record.
34 See cases cited note 7 supra.
35 See cases cited note 6 supra.
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While Wiley may be narrowly construed as an exception to the gen-
eral rule, its broader implications may lie in the court's disregard of the
seemingly formidable authority denying the power to review sentences.
Regardless of the theoretical 36 or actual 37 efficacy of appellate review as a
means of controlling arbitrary sentences, the absolute nonreview rule does
not seem doctrinally well founded. The purpose in creating the courts of
appeals was not to restrict but rather to reorganize 38 and increase 39 the
federal appellate power. The exception for contempt sentencing illustrates'
the inadequacy of the general rule: there is no very real distinction between
the discretion which a district court enjoys in sentencing for contempt-
where there are no statutory limits-and that which it in fact has in a case
where there is a sizable range between the statutory maximum and
minimum.40 If the federal appellate courts need exercise "special respon-
sibility" in overseeing lower court discretion in contempt sentencing,41 at
least ordinary responsibility would seem necessary in supervising the discre-
tion employed in sentencing within wide statutory limits. At the least, the
instant case holds that a federal court of appeals can review a sentence, even
though it is within statutory limits, where the district court has disclosed 
42
36 The policy desirability of appellate review of trial court sentencing discretion
has been well discussed. See, e.g., Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal
(pts. 1-2), 37 COLUm. L. REv. 521, 762 (1937) ; Sobeloff, The Sentence of the Court:
Should There Be Appellate Review?, 41 A.B.A.J. 13 (1955). There does not seem
to be a policy distinction between the state and federal judiciary. Even should there
be lack of uniformity among the circuits, this is preferable to the present system of
complete trial court despotism. Legislative action has been espoused as an alternative
to judicial adoption of sentence review: the Model Penal Code suggests legislative
criteria to narrow the trial courts discretion. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.06-.09, 7.01-.02,
.04 (Tent Draft No. 2, 1954). It has also been suggested that sentencing be taken
from the exclusive control of the court and placed in the hands of a professional panel.
GLUEcK, CIRME AND JUSTICE 225-30 (1936).
37 Connecticut has by statute set up a special three-judge court to review sen-
tences. CONN. GEN. STAT. RaV. §§ 51-194 to -197 (1958). For a discussion of the early
results of the system, see Note, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions:
A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453 (1960).
38 See United States v. Dickenson, 213 U.S. 92, 97 (1909); Lau Ow Bew v.
United States, 144 U.S. 47, 55 (1892).
89 See note 13 supra.
40 The statute under which Wiley was indicted stated no minimum sentence and
a maximum of $5,000 fine, ten years imprisonment, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1958).
This should be contrasted with contempt sentencing. In Green v. United States, 356
U.S. 165 (1958), the Supreme Court did not reverse a sentence of three years im-
prisonment for a very serious contempt consisting of fleeing from a court order of
surrender and remaining a fugitive for four and a half years after the defendant's
conviction had been affirmed thereby terminating his liberty on bail pending appeal.
Much lesser sentences were involved in cases where the sentence was held to be
too severe. Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363 (1958) (per curiam) (one year) ;
Rosenfeld v. United States, 167 F.2d 222 (4th Cir. 1948) (one year imprisonment
or $1,000 fine); cf. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 304-05 (1947), where a
$3,500,000 fine was reduced to $700,000 payable immediately and assessment of the
remaining $2,800,000 was made conditional on the union's failing to "purge" itself
of the contempt within a reasonable time.
41 See Green v. United States, supra note 40, at 188. The Supreme Court stated:
"Appellate courts have . . . a special responsibility [in contempt cases] for deter-
mining that the [sentencing] power is not abused, to be exercised if necessary by
revising themselves the sentences imposed."
42 A possible ramification of the holding in Wiley is that district courts will
attempt to avoid reversal by more carefully worded statements, or by giving no
explanation at all of their reasons for imposing sentence.' See also Commonwealth
v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 AtI. 733 (1932).
1961]
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that the sentence is based on criteria antithetical to the safeguards of the
federal criminal procedure. And the pressure for review is especially
strong where those criteria fly in the face of safeguards which derive from
or implement the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Hopefully the deci-
sion will lead to a wholesale reexamination of the general nonreview rule-
a reexamination based on a reasoned analysis of authority, statutory inter-
pretation, and policy.
43
FEDERAL COURTS-STATUF LimITING TORT AcTIoNs
AGAiNST MUNICIPALITIES TO STATEs Coums DEPREs FEDER.AL
CouRT OF DivE-sITY JURIsDICTIoN
Plaintiff, a resident of California, brought a diversity action in a fed-
eral district court against a Virginia municipal corporation to recover for
injuries resulting from an accident allegedly caused by defendant's negligent
maintenance of its streets. The municipality moved to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction, contending that the federal court was barred from entertain-
ing the suit by a Virginia statute which provides that "no claim, suit or
proceeding for damages based on tort shall be . . . maintained against
any . . . city . . . except in a court of the Commonwealth . ... " 1
The court dismissed the action, holding that a state's right to protect its
municipalities from liability altogether permits it constitutionally to pre-
scribe the conditions upon which-including the forum in which-those
municipalities may be sued.2 Markham v. City of Newport News, 184 F.
43 See note 21 supra. Even on the narrow holding, see text accompanying note
42 supra, there can be postulated a split among the circuits. Although there was not
a petition for certiorari in the instant case, this conflict could be the basis of granting
the writ in the next case concerning federal appellate review of sentencing. See Sup.
CT. R. 19. The history of Wiley on remand is interesting. The district court filed a
memorandum opinion in which it reviewed the factors that prompted the court origi-
nally to impose the three-year sentence. Concluding that the three-year sentence was
proper, the trial judge reimposed it but suspended execution in compliance with the
court of appeals' mandate. The effect of this disposition was to free the defendant
from any obligation as a result of his conviction. United States v. Wiley, 184 F.
Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
1 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-42.1 (Supp. 1960) : "No claim, suit or proceeding for dam-
ages based on a tort shall be asserted, instituted or maintained against any county,
city, town, district, board, commission, officer acting in his official capacity pursuant
to the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth, agency or other political sub-
division of the Commonwealth or of any county, city or town except in a court of the
Commonwealth established under or pursuant to the Constitution of Virginia and
having jurisdiction and venue of such claim, suit or proceeding."
2 The court spent a considerable portion of its opinion in making an initial deter-
mination that the statute limited jurisdiction to the state courts. Any possibility that
federal jurisdiction was not ousted because the act pertained only to venue was re-
jected. By reversing the jurisdiction-venue holding, the court of appeals may avoid
the constitutional question posed by the district court's construction of the statute. In
regard to the likelihood of reversal if the constitutional issue is reached, note that the
Fourth Circuit, to which the instant case has been appealed, has indicated in dictum
that a statute limiting jurisdiction to state courts is void. Popp v. Archbell, 203 F.2d
287, 289 (4th Cir. 1953).
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Supp. 659 (E.D. Va. 1960), appeal docketed, No. 8216, 4th Cir., Sept. 20,
1960.
The Constitution extends federal jurisdiction to suits between citizens
of different states.3 A state may bar a cause of action from a federal court
in diversity by closing the doors of its own courts to that cause; 4 but it
may not restrict federal diversity jurisdiction by creating an action cog-
nizable only in state courts.5 The rule does not apply, however, where the
state is itself a defendant. Under the eleventh amendment, a state is
immune from suit in the federal courts by citizens of another state; 6 it
may thus subject itself to suit in its own courts while refusing to submit
to federal jurisdiction.7 Thus, only where the eleventh amendment "sover-
eign immunity" applies can a state bar a federal court from entertaining
under diversity jurisdiction a cause of action recognized in the state courts.
The court in the instant case articulated no eleventh amendment basis
for its conclusion that the Virginia statute constitutionally limits the juris-
diction of a federal court in a diversity action. It instead based the deci-
sion on Detroit v. Osborne,8 which held, as the present court said, that "the
liability or non-liability of a municipal corporation is purely a matter local
in nature." 9 The court also invoked progeny of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,10
finding language which appeared to it to limit federal diversity jurisdiction
3 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity . . . between Citizens of different States .... " See 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1958).
4 Rickman v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 157 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1946);
see Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) ; Angel v. Bullington, 330
U.S. 183 (1947) (alternative holding).
5 E.g., Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529 (1893); Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890); Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118
(1868). See 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 112.09, at 435 (2d ed. 1948) : "[N]o state
statute giving one of its courts . . . exclusive jurisdiction of a certain class of
litigation can impair the jurisdiction of the federal courts over an actual case or con-
troversy within the jurisdiction conferred by Congress. ' The court in the instant case
recognized Chicot County, Lincoln County, and Cowles as authority against its hold-
ing, but rejected those cases on the theory that they had been overruled by Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Their continued vitality, however, is evidenced by
frequent recent citation of their holdings. See Koster v. (American) Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 520 n.1 (1946) (dictum); Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 579 n.6 (1946) (dictum); Grady County v. Dicker-
son, 257 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 909
(1958). See also 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra 112.09.
6 U.S. CoxsT. amend. XI: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State."
7 Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946) (with re-
spect to fiscal matters) ; Great No. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944) ; Smith
v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
8 135 U.S. 492 (1890). The plaintiff was injured because of a defective sidewalk.
The defendant city demurred to the complaint, contending that the law of Michigan
did not allow cities to be held liable for such injuries. The Supreme Court held that
the demurrer should have been sustained because the state of Michigan had not rendered
its cities liable for this type of tort.
O Instant case at 661.
10 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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on the basis of state law." This analysis, however, fails in two respects.
Detroit v. Osborne does not support the proposition that state policy re-
garding municipal liability governs the jurisdiction of federal courts. In
that case, the Supreme Court refused to hold the city liable in tort because
state courts refused to do so. No question of federal jurisdiction to hear
the case was presented, decided, or implied; the case decided only that
Detroit's freedom-from-liability defense, good in state courts, was likewise
good in federal courts.' 2 The court also misused the Erie doctrine, dis-
torting its underlying philosophy that federal courts in diversity cases
should reach substantially the same result as a state court.13 The instant
case invokes Erie to restrict an action to a state court, not to arrive at the
same result as would the state court.14 The court's conclusion that Virginia
constitutionally can deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction in a diversity
action against a municipality cannot be sustained by its analysis. The
fallacy lies in the court's theory that federal deference to local laws with
respect to liability compels deference to local laws governing jurisdiction.
The theory clearly conflicts with settled law.15 Virginia's statute, if it can
be sustained at all, can be upheld only on the grounds of eleventh amend-
ment state immunity from suit.
Many state courts have declared municipalities to be immune from
liability with regard to the performance of governmental functions, 16 but
not immune when engaging in proprietary activities.17 The immunity
surrounding governmental activities ' 8 is often characterized by the state
"lThe court quoted from and relied upon Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947): "That decision [Erie R.R. v. Tompkins]
drastically limited the power of the federal district courts to entertain suits in diversity
cases that could not be brought in the respective State courts or were barred by de-
fenses controlling in the State courts." Id. at 192, instant case at 665. This state-
ment, however, referred to the outcome of the case rather than to jurisdiction-4.e.,
Angel held that the res judicata law of North Carolina was controlling in the federal
court.
12 While Detroit might seem on its face to foreshadow Erie, it actually does not
do so. The Court distinguished between law with a wide impact-e.g., commercial
law-and law which is peculiarly local, such as that governing municipal liability.
See Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U.S. 492, 498 (1890).
's See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (dictum).
14 But see Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 198 (1947) (Reed, J., dissenting):
"In matters of procedure and jurisdiction, I take it, no one would contend that the doc-
trine of Erie Railroad is applicable."
15 See note 5 supra.
16 An example of "governmental" activity is fire protection. See Flait v. Mayor
& Council, 48 Del. 89, 97 A.2d 545 (1953) ; Perkins v. City of Lawrence, 177 Kan.
612, 281 P.2d 1077 (1955) ; Barber Labs., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 227 La. 104,
78 So. 2d 525 (1955).
17 Waterworks, for example, have been considered "proprietary." See DaPrato
Co. v. City of Boston, 334 Mass. 186, 134 N.E.2d 438 (1956); Watts v. Town of
Dickson, 36 Tenn. App. 678, 260 S.W.2d 206 (1953).
18 Resting the liability or nonliability of a municipality on a supposed distinction
between governmental and proprietary activities has been the subject of severe
criticism. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955) (dictum).
See generally Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and Private
Functions in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations,
16 Omx. L. REv. 250 (1937); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (pts. 1-3), 34
YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924); David, Tort Liability of Local Government: Alternatives
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courts 19 and the treatise writers 20 as sovereign immunity with which the
municipality is imbued as an arm of the state.21 But conclusions as to the
character of municipal freedom from liability that are not made in a federal-
state jurisdictional context are not determinative of a question whose
answer must turn on the nature of state immunity from suit under the
eleventh amendment. Immediately after the drafting of the Constitution,
its advocates asserted that states would not be amenable to suits by citizens
of other states in federal courts.2 2  But in Chisholm v. Georgia,23 decided
in 1793, the Supreme Court resolved the question against those claiming
no amenability. There was an immediate outcry leading to the hurried
passage of the eleventh amendment 2 4 The amendment was partly an out-
growth of states-rights theories which were beginning to develop at the time
of its passage.25 And most subsequent rationalizations of the state im-
to Immunity From Liability or Suit, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1 (1959); Davis, Tort Lia-
bility of Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L. Rxv. 751 (1956) ; Fuller & Casner, Munici-
pal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARv. L. REv. 437 (1941) ; Harno, Tort Immunity
of Municipal Corporations, 4 ILL. L.Q. 28 (1921); Seasongood, Municipal Corpora-
tions: Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. REv. 910
(1936).
'9 E.g., Weast v. Budd, 186 Kan. 249, 349 P.2d 912 (1960); Cox v. Board of
Comm'rs, 181 Md. 428, 31 A.2d 179 (1943). It is interesting to note that the state
courts do not dismiss the complaint on a challenge to jurisdiction but usually-as in the
above-cited cases-on a demurrer contending that there is no cause of action.
20 18 McQuILiN, MUNICIPAL CORPORAIONS § 53.24 (3d ed. 1950); 3 YoEY,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 515 (1958).
21 Commentators are somewhat confused With regard to the early origins of
municipal immunity. While it is generally agreed that Russell v. Men of Devon, 2
T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788) (unincorporated county), is the earliest case
holding that a municipality is immune from liability, the history of the doctrine in the
United States is unclear prior to Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531, 38 Am.
Dec. 669 (1842), where the governmental-proprietary distinction was first drawn. The
commentators are in agreement that Bailey was thereafter adopted by most states.
See authorities cited note 18 slpra.
22 See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 545-46 (Ford ed. 1898) (Hamilton): "It is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind;
and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the gov-
ernment of every State in the Union . . . . How could recoveries be enforced? It
is evident it could -not be done without waging war against the . . . State; and to
ascribe to the federal courts . . . in destruction of a pre-existing right of the State
governments, a power which would involve such a consequence would be altogether
forced and unwarrantable." See also 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTIONS 555 (1836) (Marshall).
23 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
24 The only existing record of Congress for that period presents sketchy reports
of the consideration of the amendment, reporting only that there was debate. 3
AN rALS OF CONG. 30 (Senate), 225, 476-77 (House of Representatives) (1794)
[1793-1795]. The amendment was passed by the Senate on January 14 and by the
House on March 4, 1794. By January 8, 1798, President Adams was able to declare
that the eleventh amendment had been ratified. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
CONSTrruTION OF THE USA 407 (1894).
25 "As the Federalists sought to broaden the scope of federal activities, Repub-
licans developed states-rights doctrines to combat the program of expansion."
SWISHER, AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOPMENT 86 (2d ed. 1954). See also
1 MORISO u & COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (4th ed. 1951),
especially with regard to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolves drafted by Madison
and Jefferson in reaction to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Id. at 377-78. Less
righteous motives for the amendment have also been advanced. Marshall saw its
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munity granted by the amendment have been made in conclusionary terms 
20
or have been based on tradition.
2 7
Subsequent judicial interpretation did not extend the political spirit
of the eleventh amendment much beyond its constitutional letter.28 While
the Court will look behind the nominal parties in order to surrender juris-
diction if a state is the real party in interest,2 9 no variation on this juris-
dictional test has been evolved which would permit a state to extend to its
political subdivisions the mantle of eleventh amendment immunity s 0-the
Court has repeatedly held counties amenable to suit in federal courts on
passage as a means by which the states could avoid payment of their debts. Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821). There are other evidences of this
motive. The Peace of Paris which ended the Revolutionary War in 1783 provided
in Article IV that "'creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment'
to recovery of pre-war debts." 1 MoRIsoN & COMMAGER, op. cit. supra at 228. The
unpopularity of that treaty provision as a reason for passage of the amendment is
further emphasized by the Senate's rejection of a substitute amendment proposed by
Senator Gallatin: "The Judicial power of the United States, except in cases arising
under treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States, by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign
State." 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 30 (1794) [1793-1795].
2 6 See Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907): "A sovereign is
exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends."
27 See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882) : "[W]hile the exemption
of the United States and of the several States from being subjected as defendants
to ordinary actions in the courts has since that time [of Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)] been repeatedly asserted here, the principle has never been
discussed or the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as an established
doctrine."
28 In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738 (1824),
Marshall enunciated two important dicta: that federal jurisdiction would depend upon
the names of the parties-if the state does not appear in the title as a party, its
interest in the outcome of the case will not oust federal jurisdiction, id. at 850-58;
and that a state officer acting under an unconstitutional state law is not protected by
the eleventh amendment, id. at 868. Marshall was forced to reject implicitly the
first dictum in Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110, 122-23 (1828),
where he held that a suit against the Governor of Georgia acting in his official capacity
was in reality a suit against Georgia. Any other holding obviously would have
destroyed the eleventh amendment. The principle of Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo was
further developed in the real-party-in-interest test set forth in In re Ayers, 123 U.S.
443 (1887). A later Court also interpreted the amendment so as to exclude a suit
against the state by one of its citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
Marshall's second dictum evolved into Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which
held that a state official cannot justify his actions under an unconstitutional state
statute on the basis of state immunity from suit-he acts as an individual. See Mr.
Justice Harlan's dissent emphasizing the importance of the case as a step toward
limiting the eleventh amendment, id. at 168.
29 1n re Ayers, supra note 28. In cases involving money recoveries, the Court
will determine the real party in interest by looking to the person on whom the loss
will fall. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
30A political subdivision's plea of immunity under the eleventh amendment is
no stronger where the state has enacted a statute attempting to endow it with the
sovereign's immunity than is a naked claim of immunity. Compare Chicot County v.
Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893) ("the jurisdiction of the federal courts is not
to be defeated by such state legislation as this"), and Lincoln County v. Luning,
133 U.S. 529 (1890), with Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118 (1868)
(state statute interpreted away so that sovereign immunity was the remaining issue),
and City of Long Beach v. Metcalf, 103 F.2d 483 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
602 (1939).
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their contracts.8 1 Likewise, in admiralty, while recognizing the "sovereign"
immunity of the state itself,32 the Court has refused to allow a city to find
protection in state common law freeing cities from liability.33  Thus, the
courts have found divorcement of city from state implicit in eleventh
amendment immunity.34 The only conclusion which can be drawn from
this judicial treatment is that state eleventh amendment immunity, like
the court's local law theory in the instant case, is insufficient to uphold
Virginia's attempt to circumscribe the diversity jurisdiction of the federal
district court.
FUTURE INTERESTS--CHAABL GIFT HELD To RVERT
TO TESTATOR'S ESTATE UpoiN 0OOURRExE OF VoiD GIFT OVER
Testator died in 1904, bequeathing several properties to the boroughs
of Bellefonte and Tyrone "In Trust forever" for the support of a "Home
for Friendless Children" from the area. He provided in a codicil that
"should there be any Reasons why the . . . [trustees] Cannot Carry out
the provisions of this will . . . then the Property that was bequeathed
. . . for the purpose of a Home if such becomes invalidated from any
cause then said Real Estate-is bequeathed absolutely to my Niece Sallie
M. Hayes . . . ." The boroughs accepted the gift, established the home,
and for many years thereafter orphans were cared for in it. However, no
children had been in the home between 1949 and the time at which the
present action was brought. The heirs of Sallie Hayes brought suit to
establish a failure of the purpose of the charitable gift and a consequent
passing of the property to them under the codicil. The lower court con-
cluded that, although no orphans were presently in the home, under a
broad construction of the term "friendless children" eligible candidates
could be found; therefore, the purpose had not failed.' Reversing, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the evidence before it showed
conclusively that the charitable purpose had failed. It further held that
31 See cases cited note 5 supra.
3 2 EX parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
3 3 Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552 (1900).
34 See Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636, 645-46 (1911):
"[N]either public corporations nor political subdivisions are clothed with that im-
munity from suit which belongs to the State alone by virtue of its sovereignty ....
Undoubtedly counties, cities, townships and similar bodies politic often have a defense
which relieves them fronz responsibility where a private corporation would be liable.
But they must at least make that defense. They cannot rely on freedom from
accountability as could a State." See also Gerr v. Emrick, 143 THE LEGAL INTLLI-
GENCER (Philadelphia) 405, 412 (3d Cir. Oct. 10, 1960) ; City of Newark v. United
States, 254 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1958) ; City of Long Beach v. Metcalf, 103 F.2d 483 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 602 (1939).
1 Re: Estate of Edmund J. Pruner, 1 Centre County Legal J. 45 (Orphans' Ct
1959), rev'd, 400 Pa. 629, 162 A.2d 626 (1960).
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as a result of the failure the fee which had been vested in the boroughs
determined automatically, that the executory limitation over to the niece
was void under the Rule Against Perpetuities, and that the property
therefore reverted to the estate of the testator.2  Pruner Estate, 400 Pa.
629, 162 A.2d 626 (1960).
A fee simple determinable and a fee simple subject to an executory
limitation are similar but distinct estates.3 One significant difference
between them appears in the wording of the original gift, which controls
the nature of the fee passed. A determinable fee is a gift intended to last
only so long as certain preconditions of the giving are fulfilled,4 and such
intent "is usually manifested by a limitation which contains the terms
'until,' 'so long as' or 'during,' or which contains the provision that upon the
happening of a stated event, the land is to revert to the conveyor." 5 A
series of Pennsylvania cases in the last century held that a determinable
fee might also be created by the express statement that a gift is for a
particular purpose "and no other." 6 However, without some language
going beyond the mere statement of a purpose for which a fee is to be used,
no determinable fee is created.7  On the other hand, the fee subject to an
executory limitation is created by "language effective to create an estate
in fee simple followed by language in the following form or in words of
similar import; 'but if (the stated event) happens, then (Blackacre) is to
go to (a named . . . second transferee),' or, 'upon (the stated event)
happening, then (Blackacre) is to become the property of (a named . . .
second transferee).' "8 The devisee takes a fee simple, but if the stated
event occurs he can be divested of it in favor of another. While a fee which
is defeasible upon a condition would result from either the "so long as" or
the "but if (the stated event)" wording, historically that is the limit of their
resemblance.9 And their differing effect becomes crucial in the very situa-
tion presented by the instant case-where the gift over to the second
transferee is void for remoteness. The problem then is who should take
the fee absolute when the invalid gift over fails. The general rule, accord-
ing to the Restatement, is that when an executory limitation is held invalid
as violating the Rule Against Perpetuities, the prior taker retains his fee,
2 There being no residuary clause in the will, the court remanded the case with
directions that the testator's heirs be ascertained and that the estate be distributed
under the rules of intestate succession.
3 
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY 117-19 (1936) (Introductory Note to ch. 4); id. § 44,
comment a.
4 Id. §44.
5 Id. § 44, comment 1.
6 Slegal v. Lauer, 148 Pa. 236, 23 At. 996 (1892); Sheetz v. Fitzwater, 5 Pa.
126 (1847) ; Kirk v. King, 3 Pa. 436 (1846) ; see Note, 12 U. PiTT. L. REv. 76 (1950).
7 Abel v. Girard Trust Co., 365 Pa. 34, 37, 73 A.2d 682, 684 (1950) (by im-
plication).
8
tRESTATEmENT, PROPERTY § 46, comment k (1936).
9 For the classic discussion of the distinction between these types of estates, see
Proprietors of the Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 69 Mass. 142, 146-49 (1855).
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which becomes indefeasible.10 The chief variation on this general rule is
the type of gift construed in First Universalist Soc'y v. Boland," where the
testator's will contained language creating both a determinable fee and an
executory limitation which was void for remoteness.' 2 The gift to the first
taker, because of the words "so long as" was self-limiting. Therefore, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held, it was "what is usually
called a determinable or qualified fee" followed by a possibility of reverter
in the heirs of the grantor.'3 In Pennsylvania prior to the instant case,
absent such a self-limitation or an explicit provision for reverter in the
devise, the testator transferred all interest in the estate and the entire fee
simple passed. Then, if the limitation over was void, the devisee took a fee
absolute discharged of the condition.'
4
In its concentration upon the issue of failure of the charitable gift, 5
the court in the instant case appears to have misconstrued the language of
the conditioning codicil, finding in it an express provision for reverter upon
failure of the charity.'6 Viewing the condition more accurately as an
10
R ESTATFENT, PROPERTY ap. 35 (1936) (appendix) ; see Betts v. Snyder, 341
Pa. 465, 19 A.2d 82 (1941); Smith v. Townsend, 32 Pa. 434 (1859).
"1155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892). See RESTATEmENT, PRO pmTy ap. 36
(1936) (appendix).
12 155 Mass. at 174, 29 N.E. at 524. The gift was to the society "so long as said
real estate shall . . . be devoted to the . . . support of those [enumerated] doc-
trines of the Christian religion . . . and when said real estate shall . . . be diverted
from the . . . support aforesaid . . . then the title of said society . . . shall for-
ever cease, and be forever vested in the following named persons ... "
13 155 Mass. at 174-75, 29 N.E. at 524-25.
14 Smith v. Townsend, 32 Pa. 434, 441 (1859). In Betts v. Snyder, 341 Pa. 465,
19 A.2d 82 (1941), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania discussed the distinction be-
tween these tvo types of fee: "The words by which the estate . . . [in the first
takers] was created contained no limitation on the duration of the estate and made
no provision for the reverting of the land to the testator .... The words of for-
feiture are not a true limitation on the duration of the fee granted . . . but are
merely words of divestment which are found when a fee is subject to an executory
limitation. They make the fee defeasible providing the succeeding devise over is
valid, but they do not change its essential character . . . ." Id. at 469-70, 19 A.2d
at 84. "[In Proprietors of the Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 69 Mass. 142
(1855)] just as in the present case there was no limitation in the grant of the prior
estate but there was an attempted executory devise which failed because it was in
violation of the rule against perpetuities. It was held that the first taker took an
absolute estate discharged of the condition." 341 Pa. at 470, 19 A.2d at 84.
15 See Petition of the Pa. Attey Gen. for Reargument, p. 1.
16The codicil read: "should there exist any Reasons why the . . . [trustees]
Cannot Carry out the provisions of this will . . . then the Property . . . is be-
queathed absolutely to my Niece Sallie M. Hayes . . . and all legacies that may
Revert back to Estate of E. J. Pruner are for the benefit of the Home for Friendless
Children provided said . . . [trustees] can Carry out the provisions of the Will
and if they cannot then all Legacies that Revert back to Estate of E J Pruner to
be vested in Sallie M. Hayes." Instant case at 632, 162 A.2d at 628. (Emphasis
added.) An example of the legacies herein referred to is found in another codicil:
"The Houses on Penna Avenue . . . I give in Trust to Clara R. Moyer . . . and
at the death of Clara R. Moyer the two houses to Revert back to Estate of E. J.
Pruner and to go to the Home for Friendless Children provided . . . [the trustees]
can accept the same and carry out the provision of this will & otherwise if they
cannot the two Houses to go to my Niece Sallie M. Hayes . . . ." Instant case
at 632-33, 162 A._d at 628. The reversion contemplated in both codicils is clearly
directed toward legacies other than the one to the charity, which may from time to
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executory limitation, proper construction of the will would seem to be
indicated by sections 46 and 229 of the Restatement 17 and controlled by the
Pennsylvania precedents 18 under which the charity would retain a fee
simple absolute after the executory limitation was voided. Another possible
position, one in fact espoused by the dissenting judge, would be to construe
the testamentary language as creating an alternative gift-Sallie Hayes
would take "only in the event that the two boroughs, at the death of the
testator, could not for any reason accept the gift as given."'19 Granting that
the purpose of the charitable gift had indeed failed, the statutory doctrine
of cy pres 20 pertaining to charities could then be applied under either posi-
tion. Judicial solicitude toward charities 21 would thereby be effectuated
and the testator's humanitarian intentions fulfilled.
To reach its holding the court relied on clearly distinguishable author-
ities from other jurisdictions. 22  The result is a clouding of what was
formerly clear doctrine and the establishment of a rule of construction which
time revert to the estate. In the event of such a reversion, the legacies were to pass
to the charity subject to the same conditions as the original gift. The court's apparent
misreading of the codicil is indicated by its statement that "the testator provided . . .
that if for any reason or from any cause the . . . [trustees] cannot carry out the
terms and provisions of his will, the real and personal estate given to the Home shall
revert back to his estate and be vested in his niece Sallie M. Hayes." Instant case
at 639, 162 A.2d at 632. (Emphasis added.) The court seems to have read the words
"all legacies that Revert back" as "shall revert."
17 The authority which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania accords the Restate-
ment, particularly § 229, illustrations 7 and 8, is indicated by its reliance in Betts
v. Snyder on the Brattle Square case and in the instant case on First Universalist.
Illustration 7 incorporates Brattle Square, while illustration 8 reflects First Uni-
versalist. The language in the will, however, falls within illustration 7 rather than
illustration 8.
Is See Betts v. Snyder, 341 Pa. 465, 19 A.2d 82 (1941); Smith v. Townsend,
32 Pa. 434 (1859); Graybill v. Manheim Cent. School Dist., 175 Pa. Super. 415,
106 A.2d 629 (1954).
19 Instant case at 644, 162 A.2d at 634. The dissent also went on to point out
that even accepting the majority's construction of the will its disposition was im-
proper. By determining that the gift over was invalid because it violated the Rule
Against Perpetuities, the majority negatived Sallie's heirs' interest as a party plain-
tiff. Thus, the dissent reasoned, the appeal should have been dismissed and the decree
vacated. Id. at 647, 162 A2d at 636.
20 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 13-15 (1950). But see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1
(1950). Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.10 (1950).
21 See instant case at 634, 162 A.2d at 629.
22 To support its proposition that "when the gift over . . . was invalidated
because it violated the rule against perpetuities, the real and personal property which
the testator gave, devised and bequeathed first to the Boroughs and then to Sallie
M. Hayes, revert [sic] back to the estate of the testator . . . ," instant case at
640-41, 162 A.2d at 633, the court cited five foreign authorities. One was First
Universalist, see notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text. Three involved gifts
using the same language of self-limitation-"so long as"-found in First Universalist.
Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950) ; Bailey
v. Inter-Mountain Tel. Co., 202 Tenn. 195, 196, 303 S.W.2d 726, 727 (1957); Yar-
brough v. Yarbrough, 151 Tenn. 221, 224, 269 S.W. 36 (1924). The fifth construed
a devise providing expressly for a reverter to the estate of the grantor upon failure
of the charitable gift. Fletcher v. Ferrill, 216 Ark. 583, 584, 227 S.W.2d 448, 449
(1950); cf. Randall's Estate, 341 Pa. 501, 19 A.2d 272 (1941), upon which the court
relied heavily in the instant case. It also is distinguishable because of express language
of reverter in the devise.
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has little to recommend it in either logic or policy. In effect, the court
has expanded the domain of the determinable fee, much as it did in its
earlier construction of gifts for a specific purpose "and no other." 23 Inas-
much as a possibility of reverter is a future interest which escapes the Rule
Against Perpetuities, traditional policy favoring the free alienability of
title should militate against any extension of reverter such as the instant
case has made. Moreover, the decision conflicts with a rule of construc-
tion 24 reaffirmed less than twenty years earlier in Betts v. Snyder 5 The
only significant factual distinction between Betts and the instant case is that
the gift in the former was of legal life estates with remainders to the tes-
tator's collateral relatives whereas the latter concerned the gift of a fee to a
charitable trust. This distinction was not considered by the court-indeed,
Betts is neither cited nor referred to by implication-and it would be
difficult to contend that the difference calls for a different result. There-
fore, insofar as the instant case conflicts with Betts, it should be construed
to stand for no more than the proposition that language bequeathing a
charitable gift, if followed by a condition making the fee defeasible, creates
a determinable fee in the charity without regard to the presence or absence
of express words of limitation or reverter in the grant itself.20 Even so
limited, this decision may have a disturbing effect on the construction of
wills drafted in an era when the legal effect of testamentary language was
more settled.
2 3 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
24 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
2 341 Pa. 465, 19 A.2d 82 (1941). In the Betts case, the testator conveyed
property to his wife for life, then to his brother and sister-in-law for life, and finally
to his niece and nephew "or to the survivor of them and the heirs of such survivor
forever." 341 Pa. at 466, 19 A.2d at 83. All the gifts were subject to a number of
picturesque conditions, and the testator provided that any owner who breached these
conditions should "forfeit his or her title . . .and the same shall then rest in . . .
'The Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals' . . . ." 341
Pa. at 467, 19 A2d at 83. The niece and nephew having conveyed the property to
third parties, testator's heirs at law brought suit to have the conveyance declared
void and to obtain a decree vesting the land in themselves. Both sides stipulated that
the gift over to the SPCA was void as a violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Therefore, the question squarely before the court was the same as in the instant case:
"This brings us to a consideration of the consequences resulting from the failure of
the gift to S.P.C.A. Generally the fact that a subsequent gift over is void because
in violation of the rule against perpetuities does not render the prior estates invalid
." 341 Pa. at 468, 19 A.2d at 83. Holding that the heirs at law had no claim
to the property, the court declared the case to be controlled by Smith v. Townsend,
32 Pa. 434 (1854), in which it was held "not only that the devise over was void for
remoteness but that the prior devisees took an estate in fee discharged from the
condition." 341 Pa. at 471, 19 A.2d at 85.
2 60 In a will analogous to that in the instant case, but drafted subsequent to the
perpetuities provisions of the Estates Act of 1947, PA. STAT. AN. tit 20, § 301.4(b)
(1950), the interest of a second transferee-i.e., Sallie Hayes-would presumably
be preserved inviolate for a period of at least twenty-one years. After that period
the "latent' possibility of reverter would remain as the sole cloud on the title. See
Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvanial, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1124, 1142-46
(1960).
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INCOME TAX-TAxPAYR REAizEs No TAXABLE GAIN oN
TRANSFER OF A.PPRECIATED-IN-VALUE OPTION IN- EXCHANGE FOR
His WIFE 's MARITAL RIGHTS
In 1937 taxpayer transferred to his future wife 2,000 shares of stock
having a market value of $40,000. On the same date, she executed an
option in taxpayer's favor for the repurchase, at a price of $40,000, of the
transferred shares together with any subsequent stock dividends thereon.'
As a result of several capital reorganizations, by 1951 the original shares
had become 20,000 in number with a market value of $400,000. In that
year taxpayer released his option interest to his wife as part of a property
settlement agreement which was later incorporated into a divorce decree.
On the theory that taxpayer, by settling his marital obligations with ap-
preciated property, had realized a capital gain thereon, the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency for the year 1951 in the amount
of the tax due on the difference between the value of the option-alleged
to be $360,000-and taxpayer's basis-the original one dollar consideration.
The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner,2 but the Sixth Circuit re-
versed, holding that the property taxpayer received in return for his transfer
of the option was incapable of being assigned a fair market value and that
this difficulty created an insurmountable obstacle to the application of the
capital gain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Commissioner v.
Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.),3 petitions for cert. denied, 29 U.S.L.
WEEK 3180 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1960). 4
The Internal Revenue Code requires that gain on a disposition of
appreciated property shall be computed as the "excess of the amount
realized therefrom over the adjusted basis"; 5 "amount realized" is defined
'The option is set out in Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27, 28-29 (6th
Cir.), petitions for cert. denied, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 3180 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1960).
2 Estate of Gordon A. Stouffer, 30 T.C. 1244 (1958), non-acq., 1959-2 Cum.
BuLL. 8.
SThere were three appeals decided by the court in the instant case. Appeal
No. 13946 was brought by taxpayer's estate (taxpayer having died in 1956) to
reverse the Tax Court's affirmance of the Commissioner's deficiency assessment in
Estate of Gordon A. Stouffer, 30 T.C. 1244 (1958). In Appeal No. 13945 the Com-
missioner sought reversal of the Tax Court's holding that taxpayer's capital gain was
long-term rather than short-term. No. 13945 having become a moot question, both
these appeals were reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the
taxpayer's estate. Appeal No. 13944 was taken by the Commissioner who, while agree-
ing with the decision of the Tax Court in Homer H. Marshman, 31 T.C. 269 (1958),
that the wife's basis included the market value of the option, urged that, should the
finding as to taxpayer's gain be reversed, the finding as to the wife's basis should
also be reversed. This appeal was reversed and remanded to the Tax Court for
further determination.
4 One petition was brought by taxpayer's ex-wife on the court's treatment of
the issue of her basis; the Commissioner filed another seeking certiorari to review
the holding as to taxpayer's gain if the ex-wife's petition were granted.
5 Int Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 1l1(a), 53 Stat. 37 (now INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 1001 (a)).
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as "the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the
property (other than money) received." 6 But where it is impossible to
value the economic gain that may have accrued from an otherwise taxable
transfer, realization for tax purposes is postponed. 7 Prior to the instant
case, Commissioner v. Mestas and Commissioner v. Halliwell9 held that
there can be a realization of gain when appreciated property is given in
return for the relinquishment of a spouse's marital rights.'0 Though recog-
nizing the difficulty of evaluating the property received, the courts in those
cases did not find the problem an insoluble one. By employing "the prac-
tical assumption that a man who spends money or gives property of a fixed
value for an unliquidated claim is getting his money's worth," "1 they
6Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, §111(b), 53 Stat. 37 (now INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 1001 (b)). The word "property" has been liberally interpreted by the courts.
See, e.g., United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960); Inter-
national Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943) (economic
gain from stock bonuses given employees); Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217
(2d Cir. 1940) (discharge of debt). See also note 10 infra.
7E.g., Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); Champlin v. Commissioner, 71
F.2d 23 (10th Cir. 1934). In Champlin, taxpayer was held not to have realized a
gain on the transfer of property to a corporation in return for stock. Title to the
property was being litigated at the time of the transfer, and the stock received-the
value of which was largely dependent on the asset value of the property-had no
fair market value because of the litigation. Burnet is typical of cases in which
taxpayer has transferred his property in return for variable installment payments;
it has been held that no tax liability occurs until after taxpayer has realized a return
of his original investment. In both of the situations described above, the property
received is assigned the basis of the property given, thus allowing the possibility of
any economic gain to be carried forward for subsequent realization when the new
property is transferred-or, in the case of installment contracts, when money in
excess of basis is received. The instant case, however, defies similar treatment: if
no gain is taxed at the time of the initial transfer-the divorce settlement, none can
ever be assessed against taxpayer because the marital and other rights received are by
their nature nontransferable. See also cases cited note 6 supra.
8 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695 (1942).
9 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942).
1 0 In Mesta, taxpayer transferred appreciated stock to his wife as a lump-sum
divorce settlement; the Commissioner determined a deficiency on the same theory
employed in the instant case. The Board of Tax Appeals held that taxpayer had
not realized a gain, first, because the transfer was a division of property and not
the cancellation of an unliquidated debt with appreciated property; and second,
because the property received (i.e., the release of support and dower rights) had no
fair market value. L. W. Mesta, 42 B.T.A. 933 (1940), non-acq., 1941-1 Cum.
BuLL. 17. The Third Circuit reversed, holding on the basis of Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112 (1940), that taxpayer had realized economic gain even though he
received neither money nor property in return. The problem of assigning a fair
market value to the amount realized was solved by making a practical assumption of
equality of value exchanged. Analytically it is important to distinguish the two argu-
ments set forth by the Board of Tax Appeals in Mesta. It would appear from a
close reading of the instant case, with special emphasis on its treatment of Helvering
v. Horst, supra, that the Sixth Circuit would concede-contrary to the Board's first
argument-that a husband transferring property pursuant to a property settlement
can realize a taxable gain. The court rested its reversal on the Board's second
argument-that inasmuch as the property received cannot be valued, no capital gains
tax can be assessed. Halliwell presented the same question decided in Mesta but
with one difference which was regarded as immaterial: that the agreement was
approved with the divorce decree.
"lCommissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986, 988 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316
U.S. 695 (1942).
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equated the fair market value of the property given to that of the property
received.
The court in the instant case first rejected the Mesta-Halliwell "equal
values" method of valuation as being too radical a departure from the well-
recognized "willing seller-willing buyer" formula 12 for determining fair
market value; nor could this transaction between husband and wife comply
with that more usual formula 13 because of the emotional factors involved
in negotiating the settlement. Whatever the correctness of the court's
assumption that the "willing seller-willing buyer" formula is inapplicable,
its cursory rejection of the equal values method is unwarranted. Where
no better evidence is available, the practical assumption of equal values has
been held determinative of an otherwise unknown value of property.' 4
While the use of the equal values method is premised on the assumption
of an arm's length exchange, a fully negotiated divorce settlement can
comply with the requirements of such a transaction.' 5 In fact, the very
emotional factors spoken of by the court in the instant case often make
such settlements even more closely bargained than normal business
transactions.'
Another difficulty which the court found in attempting to apply the
equal values test was that, in addition to the amount given in release of
dower and support rights, the settlement often "includes, without being so
labeled, such additional amount as the husband may be willing to pay in
order to have the marriage terminated." .7 This objection assumes that,
even though the husband negotiates the best settlement possible, he still
12 "By definition, fair market value means the price at which a willing buyer
and a willing seller would arrive, after negotiation for sale, where neither is acting
under compulsion." Estate of Williams v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 217, 218 (9th
Cir. 1958).
'3 See CCH 1960 STAND. FED. TAX REP. j[ 4430.07.
14 International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943)
(value of "amount realized" equated with value of property given for capital gains
purposes) ; Herbert Jones, 1 T.C. 1207 (1943) (amount of cash which wife's lawyer
exacted from husband for release of wife's marital rights held persuasive evidence
of the value of that right for gift tax purposes); Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co., 7 B.T.A. 835 (1927), acq. in part, VII-1 Cum. BuLL. 23, non-acq. in part,
VII-1 Cum. BuLL. 39 (1928) (value of stock issued equated for invested capital
purposes with value of land and personal services paid). See also 10 MERTENS,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 59.28 (1954, Cum. Supp. 1960) ; Greenbaum, The Basis
of Property Shall Be the Cost of Such Property: How Is Cost Defined?, 3 TAx L.
REv. 351, 370 (1948) ; Comment, 7 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 484, 492-93 (1960).
15 See Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106, 112 (1950); Commissioner v.
Patino, 186 F.2d 962, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1950); Herbert Jones, 1 T.C. 1207, 1211-12
(1943). See also LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NuPTIAL CONTRACTS
390 (rev. ed. 1953). In view of its holding in United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282
F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960), decided four months after the instant case, it is doubtful whether
the Sixth Circuit would again employ the argument that the "equal values" formula
is too radical a departure from the usual test to be used as a measure. In General
Shoe, the court did not hesitate to use the equal values formula to determine market
value, distinguishing the instant case not on the grounds that the equal values formula
cannot be used but rather on the basis that the husband and wife negotiating a divorce
settlement are not at arm's length-a prerequisite under either formula.
16 See, e.g., William B. Harding, 11 T.C. 1051 (1948), acq., 1949-1 Cum. BULL.
2; Edward B. McLean, 11 T.C. 543 (1948).
17 Instant case at 32.
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is often required to pay not only the value of the support and dower rights
but also an additional sum to terminate the marriage, thus destroying the
equality of values. But the "amount realized," notwithstanding the literal
narrowness of the Code's gain provision, is not confined to money and
tangible property-the property received can be in the form of intangible
economic benefit.' 8 The same court, four months after its decision in the
instant case, recognized this type of intangible gain. In United States v.
General Shoe Corp.,'9 it held that where a corporation, having no legal
obligation to do so, transfers appreciated property to the company's pension
plan, it realizes a gain to the extent of the appreciation. To the argument
that the corporation had not realized any gain, the court answered:
The taxpayer realized exactly the same gain here by transferring the
real estate as it would have had it sold the real estate for fair market
(or appraised) value and contributed the funds to the trust. Would
the taxpayer say that if it had sold the real estate that there would have
been no taxable gain in this situation? Can a taxpayer circumvent
the capital gains tax by such a simple device? . . . [W] e do not
conceive that in this day and age we are restricted to tangibles in tax
matters where there is actual recognizable benefit, albeit intangible, the
taxation of which is implicit in the statutory scheme .... 20
Had a similar view been taken of the instant case, it would have made no
difference that taxpayer transferred the option for intangible benefit in
addition to the property rights. His gain would be measured by the total
economic benefit that he realized-not merely by the value of the marital
property rights received. In practical terms, taxpayer has used the ap-
preciation on the option instead of cash to purchase not only a release of
marital rights but also--if the court's assumption is true-a release from
marriage. In either case, "the last step is taken by which he obtains the
fruition of the economic gain which has already accrued to him." 2 1
While the court based reversal primarily on its belief that Mesta was
wrongly decided and should not be followed, it also stated that even if
Mesta were correct it would not apply to the particular factual situation
presented by the instant case.22 Whereas in Mesta and Halliwell one side
of the exchange had a readily ascertainable fair market value,23 here neither
the option nor the marital rights could be readily evaluated. The Tax
Court had held that even though the parties to the settlement had disagreed
18 See cases cited note 6 mpra.
'9 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960).
20 Id. at 12.
21 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115 (1940). Though Horst was concerned
with the realization of income, the principle is equally applicable to capital gains.
22 Instant case at 34.
23 In both Mesta and Hallwell, the husbands transferred stock, the value of
which was determinable from other sales on the stock market.
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as to the validity of the option,24 the evidence indicated that both sides
"assumed" it was valid and worth $360,000.25 The court of appeals re-
versed this finding and held that there was an unresolved bona fide dispute
over the validity of the option. Since it is well recognized that an asset
subject to a bona fide legal claim is worth less than it would be in the
absence of such a claim,2 ' the court concluded that, without further evi-
dence, the value at which the option was exchanged was indeterrninable.
27
If the court is correct as to the existence of an unresolved dispute, the
instant case represents a unique factual situation where even the reasonable
assumption used by Mesta does not provide a solution. 28
2 4 During negotiation, the adverse parties had disagreed as to whether the option
was valid against 20,000 shares, 2,000 shares, or not valid at all. The problem centered
on the language of the option which specified "two thousand shares."
25 30 T.C. 1244, 1248 (1958).
26 See Champlin v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 23 (10th Cir. 1934).
2 7 Instant case at 34. The court's finding that the option cannot be valued due
to the unresolved dispute will have further repercussions when the Tax Court, on
remand, attempts to redetermine the ex-wife's basis. See notes 3 and 4 mtpra.
Commissioner v. Patino, 186 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1950), indicated that the wife's basis,
in the usual divorce settlement situation, is the fair market value of the property she
receives. Inasmuch as the option here has no determinable value, her basis for the
stock would be the same as his was in 1937, when he gave the stock to her; as donee
she assumes her donor's basis. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 113(a) (2), 53 Stat.
40 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1015 (a)). But neither logic nor authority compel
this conclusion. By relinquishing her marital rights, the wife has clearly given-some-
thing additional for the option; that additional relinquishment is a "cost" to her the
value of which should be included in her basis. To determine this cost, however,
necessitates a monetary evaluation of the very items the court has already found to
be incapable of valuation in the instant case; and to discount it entirely and refuse
to "step up" her basis to 1951 fair market value would mean assessing gain tax on
the marital rights. While these rights as such have a zero basis-they cost the wife
nothing in the tax sense-this has not prevented courts from attributing fair market
value as the cost of the property received when the property given was a release of
marital rights. Commissioner v. Patino, supra; Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner,
160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947). Since the underlying reason for not assessing a tax
on the husband is the uncertain amount of gain, reluctance to saddle the taxpayer
with a possibly excessive tax obtains equally to the determination of the wife's basis.
Unlike those cases where the failure to tax the gain on a transfer of property merely
effects a postponement, see note 7 supra, neither the husband nor the wife will ever
pay a tax on the pretransfer appreciation of the stock if her basis is set at fair market
value. But the small loss of revenue-the rarity of situations like the instant case
forecloses the possibility of a substantial revenue loss-would seem to be a better
alternative than making an arbitrary assessment.
2 8 In situations where the Mesta doctrine of "equal values" can be employed-i.e.,
where the value of the property given in exchange is known, its application is jus-
tified by two additional considerations. From the standpoint of the taxing power
generally, the gain that has accrued on an asset transferred by the husband should
not escape taxation. Thus, the question reduces itself to who between the husband
and wife should pay the tax, and when? Mesta, by placing the tax burden on the
husband, seems to be in accord with the undertakings of the parties to the settlement:
for example, when a husband agrees to transfer stock of a certain value, he undertakes
to transfer that amount of stock and not that amount less the capital gains tax which
is due on the appreciation. Secondly, by taxing the husband for all appreciation up to
the time of transfer, the gain phase of the tax law is brought into accord with the
cases dealing with the wife's basis for the property received in such transfers. See,
e.g., Commissioner v. Patino, supra note 27; cf. Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner,
supra note 27. Both cases indicate that the wife's basis is the fair market value of
the property when she receives it. And if no alternative to the Mesta doctrine is
clearly required, the pursuit of consistency in the taxing structure is a proper goal.
See Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945).
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NEGLIGENCE-IIomE WHICHa PROVIDED NEESSARY MpmDICAL
CARE TO ACIDENT VICTIM PURSUANT To LiFE-CARE CONTRACT
CANNOT RECOVER ExPENSES FOR SUCH CARE FROM NEGLIGENT
DEFENDANT
As a result of defendant's negligence, decedent was injured in an auto-
mobile accident and died six weeks after the injury. Plaintiff, obligated
under the terms of a life-care contract with decedent to provide him essen-
tial medical care, brought suit to recover for treatment, nursing, medication,
and hospitalization expenses it had incurred during the six-week period,
basing the action on its direct right against the tortfeasor or, in the alter-
native, on its rights under the contract's subrogation clause. Sustaining a
general demurrer without leave to amend, the trial court dismissed the
action. The district court of appeal reversed, holding that plaintiff had
stated a cause of action directly and in its own right for the expenses
involved.1 The Supreme Court of California affirmed the trial court's
judgment and ordered that the district court opinion be vacated. Fifild
Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 635, 354 P.2d 1073 (1960).
Life-care contracts, an integral part of California's program for the
aged,2 are authorized and regulated by statute.3 The statutory scheme,
however, does not speak to the collateral rights and liabilities of the con-
tracting parties. At common law, "a tort to the person or property of one
man . . . [did] not make a tortfeasor liable to another merely because
the injured person was under a contract with that other, unknown to the
doer of the wrong." 4 This doctrine was followed in one of the earliest
contract-for-care cases, Anthony v. Slaid,5 where the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts denied recovery for medical expenses incurred on
behalf of an injured pauper by an individual under a contractual duty to
care for town paupers. Similarly, insurance companies 6 have been denied
1 Fifield Manor v. Finston, 178 Cal. App. 2d 245 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
2 See 17 OPs. CAL. AiT'y GEN. 203 (1951).
3 CAL. WLFARE & INsT'xs CODE §§ 2350-60. Under these sections such matters
as the content of the contract, reserve requirements for homes, inspection of facilities,
and audits are regulated. There is no indication in the report of the instant case as to
what the life-care contract involved included in addition to medical care. The usual
contract provides room, board, and medical care in exchange for the transfer of all the
individual's assets and assignment of any future income from these assets to the
home.
4 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927) (Holmes, J.).
See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947); The Federal No. 2,
21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927) ; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H.R.R.,
25 Conn. 265 (1856); Anthony v. Slaid, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 290 (1846); Brink v.
Wabash RIL, 160 Mo. 87, 60 S.W. 1058 (1901); Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co.,
47 Ohio Abs. 586, 73 N.E.2d 200 (County Ct App. 1946) ; 1 HARPER & JAmEs, ToRTs
509 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTs 732 (2d ed. 1955).
5 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 290 (1846).
6 Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877) ; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
New York & N.H.R.R., 25 Conn. 265 (1856); Mercer Cas. Co. v. Perlman, 62 Ohio
App. 133, 23 N.E.2d 502 (1939). The insurer is allowed subrogation in cases of
property insurance but not where personal insurance policies are involved. Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. J. B. Parker & Co., 96 Tex. 287, 72 S.W. 168 (1903); Martin v.
Lavender Radio & Supply, Inc., 228 Ark. 85, 305 S.W.2d 845 (1957) (dictum);
Harper, Interference With Contractual Relations, 47 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 873, 889-90
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relief when attempting to recover in their own right from persons injuring
individuals insured by them. Increased premium rates in workmen's
compensation cases are not recoverable by the employing firm,7 nor are
benefit payments under statutes not allowing subrogation.8 And recovery
against the injuring party is generally denied in the government-soldier,9
shipowner-seaman, 10 and employer-employee 11 relationships, even though
the imposition of liability for medical care upon the final riskbearer-for
example, the government-arises from contract or by law. On the other
hand, relief has been granted to a master for the loss of his servant's
services 12 and to a wife who incurs medical expenses on behalf of her in-
jured husband.13 Recovery in the husband-wife cases is based partly on
(1953). Because of the difficulty in estimating damages in personal injury and death
cases, it is thought better to allow the injured person or his heirs the benefits both
of insurance and also of any judgment obtained from the tortfeasor rather than to
base compensation only on the injured party's own estimation of his injury, as meas-
ured by his insurance, or on a court's estimation, as measured by the size of the
judgment. However, a subrogation clause in the contract would probably be
enforced. 3 APPLEMAN, INsURAwcE LAW & PRAcTIcE § 1675 (1941).
7 Northern States Contracting Co. v. Oakes, 191 Minn. 88, 253 N.W. 371 (1934).
8 Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 251 F.2d 97
(10th Cir. 1957); Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 115
F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 702 (1941). But see Staples v.
Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 62 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1932); Stinchcomb v. Dodson,
190 Okla. 643, 126 P.2d 257 (1942). However, under workmen's compensation
statutes requiring payment of benefits to the state if the designated beneficiaries are
nonexistent, the insurance carrier is given an independent cause of action against
negligent tortfeasors. Phoenix Indem Co. v. Staten Island R. T. Ry., 224
App. Div. 346, 230 N.Y. Supp. 747 (1928), aff'd, 251 N.Y. 127, 167 N.E. 194
(1929), aff'd, 281 U.S. 98 (1930); Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Shafton, 231 Wis. 1,
285 N.W. 408 (1939). Occasionally workmen's compensation statutes will allow
the carrier to pursue the third party exclusive of the rights of the injured person
or the insured employer. Burum v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 169 P.2d 256,
260 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946), revd on other grounds, 30 Cal. 2d 575, 184 P.2d 505
(1947); Whalen v. Athol Mfg. Co., 242 Mass. 547, 136 N.E. 600 (1922).
9 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947); United States v.
Atlantic C.L.R.R., 64 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.C. 1946).
10 The Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927). Jones v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 155 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1946), allowed a shipowner indemnity against a negligent
third party for medical expenses paid as a result of an injury to a seaman. The court
based its result on an analogy to master-servant and family law and on the special
status of seamen. One case on which it relied, United States v. Standard Oil Corp.,
60 F. Supp. 807 (S.D. Cal. 1945), was subsequently reversed, 153 F.2d 958 (9th
Cir. 1946), aff'd, 332 U.S. 301 (1947). Two courts have refused to follow Jones.
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Paton, 194 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1952); Gomes v. Eastern Gas &
Fuel Associates, 127 F. Supp. 435 (D. Mass. 1954).
"'Chelsea Moving & Trucking Co. v. Ross Towboat Co., 280 Mass. 282, 182
N.E. 477 (1932); Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 337 Pa. 1, 10
A.2d 434 (1940).
12 As used here "servant" is limited to its historical meaning and does not include
other categories of employees. Ames v. Union Ry., 117 Mass. 541 (1875) (ap-
prentice); PROSsER, TORTS 729 (2d ed. 1955); STREET, TORTS 374, 375 (1955).
But see United States v. Standard Oil Corp., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (soldier);
Cain v. Vollmer, 19 Idaho 163, 112 Pac. 686 (1910) (jockey).
13 Husbands have long been able to recover in this situation. 1 HARPER &
JAMES, ToRTs 636 (1956); 3 VERNmER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws § 158 (1935).
However, the wife has been granted this right only fairly recently. Follansbee v.
Benzenberg, 122 Cal. App. 2d 466, 265 P.2d 183 (Dist. Ct App. 1954); Thompson v.
City of Bushnell, 346 Ill. App. 352, 105 N.E.2d 311 (1952); McDaniel v. Trent
Mills, Inc., 197 N.C. 342, 148 S.E. 440 (1929); Hansen v. Hayes, 175 Ore. 358, 154
P.2d 202 (1944).
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statutes which require the wife to bear certain expenses incurred either by
herself or by her husband.
14
Denial of recovery in the instant case can be reasoned on several tradi-
tional grounds. Some cases have taken the position that the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's financial injury is not the defendant's negligent act
but rather the plaintiff's contract with the injured party.15 Others, includ-
ing the instant case, have resorted to the terminology of remoteness 16 to
describe essentially the same situation-the lack of a sufficient connection
between the defendant and the plaintiff. But medical expenses are a natural
consequence of an automobile accident in which persons are injured; any
defendant found negligent can expect that he will have to pay such expenses
as a part of the judgment against him, regardless of who rendered the
medical care initially. And once liable to pay someone, it is of little matter
to the defendant in the instant case whether he pays the home or the injured
person. Even though the home's financial loss does arise from the contract,
the home alone incurred the primary obligation for the payment of the
medical expenses, having assumed this obligation in its contract with the
decedent. Here, the instant case differs from the insurance cases, from
which the law in this area is primarily derived. The object of the insurance
contract is reimbursement of the insured for loss incurred by the insured;
the insurer is only secondarily liable for the payment of the expenses. A
second argument against allowing recovery is based on the fear that the
defendant will be unduly prejudiced in that he might be subjected to double
payment.17  If a new cause of action is created where there already exists
in another a right to sue for the same damages, this fear is justified. But
that situation does not exist in the instant case-death has removed from
litigation the logical person to recover. The California wrongful death
statute has been held not to allow recovery of medical expenses by the heirs
or personal representative of the decedent,' 8 and it is doubtful that his estate
can recover under the survival statute.19 Thus, if the home cannot recover,
' 4 E.g., Follansbee v. Benzenberg, supra note 13; Hansen v. Hayes, supra
note 13. A typical state statute is CAL. Civ. CODE § 171, providing that the wife's
separate property is liable for debts contracted by either the husband or wife for
the necessaries of life furnished to either while they are living together.
15 E.g., Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877) ; The Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d
313 (2d Cir. 1927) ; Anthony v. Slaid, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 290 (1846).
16E.g., Insurance Co. v. Brame, supra note 15; Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v.
Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 251 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1957); Chelsea Moving &
Trucking Co. v. Ross Towboat Co., 280 Mass. 282, 182 N.E. 477 (1932).
17 See Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H.R.1L, 25 Conn. 265
(1856) ; 1 HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS 506 (1956).
'1 Fitzgerald v. Quinn, 131 Cal. App. 457, 21 P.2d 656 (Dist. Ct. App. 1933);
see Follansbee v. Benzenberg, 122 Cal. App. 2d 466, 265 P.2d 183 (Dist. Ct. App.
1954) ; Killion, Wrongful Death Actions in California: Some Needed Amendnents,
25 C~ALr. L. REv. 170, 175 (1937).
19 The court in the instant case states that decedents estate can recover these
medical expenses. For support it cited cases in which the plaintiff himself, not yet
dead, recovered under the "collateral source rule." See 2 HAPER & JAmms, TORTS
1343, 1344 (1956). At the same time the court ignored Follansbee v. Benzenberg,
mtpra note 18, which interpreted both the wrongful death and survival statutes of
California (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377; CAL. Crv. CODE § 956) as denying to the
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no one can; the burden which, under the fault system, should properly fall
upon the negligent defendant will be borne by the home.2 ° A third argu-
ment procedes from the premise that, should the home be allowed to
recover, litigation will be greatly increased.2 ' This is at best only a make-
weight contention-and one especially vulnerable here where the relative
infrequency of the situation limits the incidence of suit.
On the positive side, a helpful analogy may be drawn from cases like
Follansbee v. Benzenberg,22 where a decedent's wife was permitted to
recover medical expenses which she had incurred on behalf of her husband.
In both Follansbee and the instant case, the plaintiff had a primary obliga-
tion to pay the expenses in question. That the wife's duty was statutorily
imposed as distinguished from contractual is immaterial once the obligation
has been satisfied. In rejecting this analogy, the California court stressed
the familial aspect of Follansbee,23 but the considerations which obtain in
that relationship are closely paralleled by the legislatively recognized de-
sirability and necessity of the contribution made to society by such arrange-
ments as life-care contracts. With eight per cent of the population of the
United States sixty-five years of age and above,24 the problem of caring for
our elder citizens is acute and will become even more so as their numbers
increase.25 Where a plan is helping to alleviate the difficulty, it should not,
without compelling reason, be hindered by increasing the costs of its opera-
tion.26 Such is the result of the instant decision.
estate recovery of losses incurred by the decedent's wife in paying decedent's medical
expenses. In light of the terms of the survival statute limiting recovery to "expenses
sustained or incurred as a result of the injury by the deceased . . . " the statement
of the court in the instant case is questionable. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3,
§ 494 (Smith-Hurd 1941); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.601 (1950); RI. GEN.
LAws ANN. § 10-7-5 (1956); Tsx. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671, 4677 (1952). All
these statutes provide for survival of medical expense claims.
20 Under most workmen's compensation statutes, for example, provision is made
for reimbursement of the insurer by the wrongdoer. WRIGHT, SUBROGATION UNDER
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS 1 (1948). This is desirable to decrease costs at
the expense of the wrongdoer. RiESENFELD & MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEG IsLA-
TION 417 (1950). One possible countervailing consideration in the instant case is
that the homes should act to prevent these accidents. Large grounds, fences, super-
vision, and other steps are possible methods of reducing the risks involved to a
minimum and thus helping to avoid the burden referred to above. The care taken by
Fifield Manor is not known.
21 Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 47 Ohio Abs. 586, 592, 73 N.E.2d 200, 203
(County Ct. App. 1946). The instant case incorporated this argument by quoting from
Stevenson, which denied recovery in an employee's action for wages lost due to his
shop's being closed because of the danger of explosions at defendant's plant which
was several blocks distant.
22 122 Cal. App. 2d 466, 265 P.2d 183 (Dist. Ct App. 1954). See note 13 Vipra.
This analogy was made by the district court of appeal in the instant case, Fifield
Manor v. Finston, 178 Cal. App. 2d 245, 247 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
23 In denying the applicability of Follansbee, and limiting that case to its facts,
the court may well be expressing its general disapproval of that type of recovery.
24 CoRsoN & MCCONNELL, ECONOMIC NEDS OF OLDER PEOPLE 17 (1956).
25While our total population doubled since 1900, the number of people over
sixty-five has quadrupled. Id. at 4. The trend will continue. Estimated at 15,779,000
in 1960, the numerical rise of that age group is projected to 19,549,000 in 1970 and
24,526,000 in 1980. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 6 (1959).
26 Due to the differing nature of life-care contracts and the homes which provide
them, the extent of hindrance imposed will vary. For some homes-those with a
minimum entrance fee based on a closely calculated approximation of future ex-
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One justification for the court's refusal to permit "an unwarranted
extension of liability for negligence"--one not even alluded to in the opinion
-is the traditional concern of the courts to avoid the subjection of a debtor
to a multiplicity of suits 2 7 The instant case has all the ramifications of a
partial assignment in that the defendant could be called upon to defend two
separate suits-one by the home and another brought by the decedent's
estate for those claims which survive. Under this theory, even Follansbee
proves no obstacle, for there the plaintiff was not only the decedent's widow
but also the administratrix of his estate. Nor would the prejudicial effect
on the defendant be here avoided by permitting recovery on a theory of
subrogation. Although this pitfall of multiplicity might have been avoided
by a joinder of parties plaintiff,28 such was not the posture of the instant
case.
With regard to the plaintiff's claim based on its rights under the
contract's subrogation clause, the court concluded that because assignment
of personal injury claims is prohibited by statute 29 subrogation could not
be allowed.30 The common-law rule, which has been altered in some
states,31 forbade such assignments in order to prevent champerty and main-
tenance.32 But subrogation avoids the "dangers" of assignment: in the
instant case, the agreement was made prior to the accrual of any claim, the
home had undertaken an obligation irrespective of this particular claim,
and there was no sale of an action at discount value. The subrogation-
assignment equation is inapposite for the further reason that California does
expressly extend a right of subrogation to personal injury claims in a
penses-the burden may be heavy. For others-with a less socially conscious attitude,
possibly combined with a more prosperous clientele-the burden may well be neg-
ligible. Other factors are the time between the injury and death of the person,
the resulting expenses, and the amount of predicted care left to be provided had he
lived. For example, if the decedent's life expectancy was ten years and the expenses
incurred were only $500, it is possible that the home would end up with a net
"profit." The extent to which each of these considerations was present in the instant
case is unknown, though it can be fairly assumed that the home lost money as a
result of the accident.
2 7 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 168 (2d ed. 1947); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 156
(1932) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 442 (3d ed. 1960).
28 CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 378.
29 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 956: "Nothing in this article shall be construed as mak-
ing such a thing in action [personal injury claims] assignable."
30 Contra, RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 162, comment h (1937).
31 In some states, the sole test of assignability is whether such personal injury
claims survive the death of the injured person. See, e.g., Ishmael v. City Elec. of
Anchorage, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 688 (D. Alaska 1950); Hereford v. Meek, 132 W. Va.
373, 52 S.E.2d 740 (1949); CLARK, CODE PLEADING 164 (2d ed. 1947); PROSSER,
TORTS 709 (2d ed. 1955). Under this test, some states allow assignment of these
claims. E.g., Alexander v. Creel, 54 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Mich. 1944); Kithcart v.
Kithart, 145 Iowa 549, 124 N.W. 305 (1910); McCloskey v. San Antonio Traction
Co., 192 S.W. 1116 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). Others, however, continue the ban.
E.g., Goldfarb v. Reicher, 112 N.J.L. 413, 171 Atl. 149 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam,
113 N.J.L. 399, 174 Atl. 507 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934) ; Bethlehem Fabricators, Inc. v.
H. D. Watts Co., 286 Mass. 556, 190 N.E. 828 (1934).
32 Rice v. Stone, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 566 (1861); 4 CoRnIN, CONTRACTS § 856
(1951) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 405 (3d ed. 1960).
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number of circumstances. 33 Even conceding for the moment the undesir-
ability of allowing the home's direct recovery against the tortfeasor, a
blanket disapprobation of subrogation is questionable on two counts. First,
it denies an action to the real party in interest; 34 and second, it apparently
negatives the availability of subrogation even where the home might attempt
to assert this right against an injured party's estate which has already re-
covered damages representing, among other things, the cost of medical
care. 5 Where the parties concerned have contracted for subrogation and
where good reasons exist favoring such an agreement, express statutory
authority should not be necessary to validate it..6 There is little sense in
confining the benefits of compensation to the estate if the claim survives
or to the wrongdoer if it does not.
If recovery were allowed in the instant case, the rule thus established
would not necessarily extend to organizations whose primary business
is insurance. The home which enters into a life-care contract undertakes
an unlimited obligation of care-an obligation which is at the same time
incalculable. The home must provide care in the event of a whole range
of contingencies which require correspondingly varied financial expendi-
tures. On the other hand, the obligation assumed by insurers is generally
limited to a definite maximum expenditure and calculable to a high degree
of certainty by the use of actuarial principles. While a principle allowing
recovery would not, then, extend to insurers generally, it might well en-
compass the master-servant 3 7 and shipowner-seaman 38 relationships, where
an unlimited obligation of care and protection-similar to that undertaken
by the home-is assumed.
PRIVILEGES-WITNESS-SPOUSE HAS No PRIVILEGE TO R EUSE
To TESTIFY AGAINST HER HUSBAND WHN SHE Is THE VICTIM
oF His MAN ACT VIOLATIoN
Petitioner was tried and convicted for transporting a woman in inter-
state commerce in violation of the Mann Act.1 At trial, the woman, who
33 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 21451 (state retirement plan); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3852
(workmen's compensation); CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17153 (automobile property
damage).
34 When an insurer has paid a loss sustained by the insured, he is subrogated to
the rights of the insured against those who caused the loss and may sue the latter
in his own name. Offer v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 114, 120, 228 Pac. 11, 13-14
(1924); 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §482 (Rules ed.
1950) ; CLARK, CODE PLEADING 174 (2d ed. 1947). If the insured receives compen-
sation from the tortfeasor, most courts will allow the insurer to proceed against the
insured for reimbursement, the measure of damages varying from state to state.
8 CoucH, INsURANCE §2002 (1931). In the case of partial subrogation, both insurer
and insured may bring independent actions. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 177 (2d ed.
1947).
35 Cf. Michigan Medical Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713 (1954).
36 3 APPLEMAN, oP. cit. supra note 6, § 1675.
37 See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
38 Compare note 10 supra and accompanying text.
118 U.S.C. §§2421-23 (1958).
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had married petitioner some time after the commission of the offense,2
was ordered to testify against petitioner, even though both he and she
objected. Petitioner argued that the compulsion of his wife's testimony
violated the rule permitting him to exclude his wife's adverse testimony
as well as his wife's privilege to refrain from testifying against him.3 The
court of appeals affirmed the conviction 4 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Affirming, the Court held that in a prosecution of the husband
for a Mann Act violation against his wife neither spouse may claim the
marital privilege to withhold testimony. Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S.
525 (1960).
The common-law rule that allows one spouse to prevent the other
from testifying against him in a criminal proceeding 5 rests on the assump-
tion that the exclusion of such testimony will preserve the harmony of the
marital relationship, and on a judgment that the preservation of marriages
is more important than the introduction of pertinent evidence. 6 Hawkins
v. United States 7 recently reaffirmed this privilege for the federal court
system.3 However, where one spouse is accused of having committed
a direct offense against the other, the so-called "necessity exception" pro-
2 The record was unclear as to the time of petitioner's marriage, but the Court
followed the assumption of the court of appeals that the marriage was after the com-
mission of the offense. Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 526 & n.1 (1960).
3 The Court chose not to go into the question of whether the petitioner had
standing to complain of the denial of the witness-spouse's privilege, id. at 527 n.3,
the testimony being competent, Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933). See
McCORMICK, EvmENCE § 73 (1954).
4 263 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1959). The court of appeals did not differentiate between
the privilege of the defendant-spouse and that of the witness-spouse, and thus affirmed
the conviction on the basis that, the defendant had lost his privilege because of the
necessity exception. See note 11 infra and accompanying text.
5 Two other aspects of the rule as developed by the common law are the incom-
petence of one spouse to testify for the other, discarded by the federal courts in
Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933), and the privilege of confidential spousal
communications, see Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934). See generally
McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE §§ 66, 82 (1954). The steady contraction of the rule is
summed up by the statement that "all that is left of the original doctrine is that a
spouse may not give adverse testimony against a criminal defendant over his objec-
tion in the trial of a crime committed against a third person." 32 TEMP. L.Q. 351,
353 (1959).
6 8 WiGm OF, EVIDENcE § 2228 (3d ed. 1940). See generally 3 VERNIER, A!aRI-
CAN FAMILY LAws § 226 (1935); 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra §§ 2227-45; Note, 38
VA. L. REv. 359 (1952).
7 358 U.S. 74 (1958). This case involved a Mann Act violation, but the wife was
not the woman involved in the prostitution and had testified voluntarily.
8 "The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses
shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide,
by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience." FED. R. CRIM. P. 26. In
reaffirming the common-law rule, the Court in Hawkins said that "while the rule
forbidding testimony of one spouse for the other was supported by reasons which
time and changing legal practices had undermined, we are not prepared to say the
same about the rule barring testimony of one spouse against the other." 358 U.S. at
77. The Hawkins decision was criticized on the basis that it was time to discard
the common-law rule in its entirety. See, e.g., 45 CORNELL L.Q. 121 (1959); 10
SYRAcuse L. REv. 363 (1959). The complete abolition of the rule has also been
suggested by MODEL CODE OF EVIENCE rule 215 (1942), and UNIrFORM RULE OF
EVIDENCE 23(2). The situation on the state level is governed mainly by statute.
Some states have completely abolished the rule, while others still hold that the
spouse's testimony is incompetent in certain instances. See 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 488 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1959). See also Note, 38 VA. L. Rxv. 359, 362-67 (1952).
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hibits a wrongdoer from exercising his privilege.9 The premises of the
exception are that the alleged offense may have destroyed the presumed
marital harmony, and, perhaps more important, that the wife must be
protected by allowing her to give testimony concerning the alleged offense.10
Prior to the instant case, all federal courts of appeal presented with the
question had agreed that Mann Act violations in which the wife was a victim
fall within the necessity exception." The Supreme Court adopted these
appellate court rulings in rejecting defendant's contention that he had been
erroneously deprived of his privilege to prevent his wife from testifying.'
2
But the main issue presented by the instant case-whether the witness-
spouse could invoke the marital privilege-was not met directly by the
Court; 13 instead, it decided that even if the wife possessed such a privilege
at common law,14 a legislative mandate was embodied in the Mann Act
that victims of its violation lacked the independent will to determine whether
or not to exercise such a privilege.15 It followed from this that the trial
judge could compel the wife to testify against her exploiter. The Court
reasoned that "if a defendant can induce a woman against her 'will' to enter
9 See Kerr v. United States, 11 F.2d 227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 689
(1926) (defendant mailed poisoned candy to wife); Commonwealth v. Allen, 191
Ky. 624, 231 S.W. 41 (1921) (abortion); cf. People v. Pittullo, 116 Cal. App. 2d
373, 253 P.2d 705 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953) (assault and battery; testimony permitted
under California statute).
10 See 8 WIGMORE, EvrENCE § 2239 (3d ed. 1940). In fact, whether the witness-
spouse was the object of an offense by her husband is the very issue before the court.
The witness-spouse's voluntary testimony may be the sole means of protecting her.
11 Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949); Hayes v. United
States, 168 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1948); Levine v. United States, 163 F.2d 992 (5th
Cir. 1947); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943); Pappas v.
United States, 241 Fed. 665 (9th Cir. 1917).
12 Instant case at 526-27. Petitioner argued forcefully that the reasons for the
necessity exception were inapplicable in the instant case since a woman who had
voluntarily engaged in prostitution and then married her "exploiter" could not very
well claim that she needed protection. Brief for Petitioner, p. 10. On the question
of whether the necessity exception applies where the offense occurs before the mar-
riage, United States v. Williams, 55 F. Supp. 375 (D. Minn. 1944), holds that where
the witness-spouse was a Mann Act victim, the exception was applicable. Williams
is subject to the same questioning as the instant case since it too utilizes the "lack
of independent will' theory. See note 16 infra. And in Hawkins, the Government
argued that the privilege of the defendant-spouse should be replaced by that of the
witness-spouse since she is in a better position to decide whether or not to testify.
The Court rejected this argument on the ground that voluntary testimony of the
witness-spouse would disturb the marriage as much as compelled testimony. The
Court's reasoning seems to ignore the fact that voluntary testimony by a spouse is
a good indication that there is no longer any marriage to be preserved. See Note,
38 VA. L. REv. 359 (1952) ; 101 U. PA. L. REv. 700 (1953).
13 Actually, the Court suggested that the spousal privilege does apply to the
witness-spouse. Instant case at 528-29.
34 This issue had not been determined at common law. Shores v. United States,
174 F.2d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 1949), stated in dictum that the witness-spouse could be
compelled to testify. The opposite view was implied in United States v. Mitchell,
137 F.2d 1006, 1008 (2d Cir. 1943). The absence of clear authority here is probably
explained in that the question of the witness-spouse's rights crystallizes only where
both the defendant-spouse has lost his privilege and the witness-spouse refuses to
testify voluntarily.
'5 The Court here relies on statements in the legislative history of the Mann
Act contained in H.R. REP. No. 47, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1910), and on the
fact that, under the Mann Act, consent of the victim is no defense, 18 U.S.C. § 2422
(1958). Instant case at 530,
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a life of prostitution for his benefit-and the Act rests on the view that
he can-by the same token it should be considered that he can, at least
as easily, persuade one who has already fallen victim to his influence that
she must also protect him." 16 That this particular witness-spouse might
not have been found to have been so persuaded was regarded as immaterial,
since inquiry into such collateral matters "is hardly an acceptable
solution." 17
Unfortunately, the soundness of the "lack of independent will" thesis
employed in the instant case is subject to question. First, the legislative
history relied on by the Court does not reveal an unambiguous congressional
determination that victims of Mann Act violations are incapable of making
their own decisions. As the dissent recognized, there were other policy con-
siderations in addition to the gullibility of some victims of white slavery which
led Congress to make the consent of the woman immaterial.'8 But, even
assuming such a determination of incapability, it is of doubtful soundness
to use this 1910 legislative presumption as to the mental incapacity of some
Mann Act victims with regard to consent to the prohibited act as the sole
basis for concluding that a particular victim is so devoid of will power as
to be incapable of independent exercise of the spousal immunity privilege. 19
Regardless of the alleged difficulty involved,2" it seems that an examination
into the capacity of each particular "victim" would be indispensable if the
approach adopted by the Court is to be justified.21
A judicially created rule such as that of spousal immunity may be
extended, contracted, modified, or abrogated by judicial interpretation "in
the light of reason and experience." 22 In view of the Supreme Court's
16 Instant case at 530. This same line of reasoning was employed by United
States v. Williams, 55 F. Supp. 375, 380 (D. Minn. 1944), where the court argued
that a Mann Act violator could persuade his victim to marry him just as he had
persuaded her to engage in prostitution.
'7 Instant case at 530.
1 8 "Congress chose between the interest of society in eradicating the importation
and interstate transportation of prostitutes and the interest of women to be protected
from clever and unscrupulous profiteers, on the one hand, and the voluntary engage-
ment of women in prostitution on the other." Instant case at 534 (dissenting opinion).
19 Note the Court's statement only six weeks later in United States v. Dege,
364 U.S. 51 (1960) (husband and wife held capable of criminally conspiring), that
"a wife's legal submission to her husband has been wholly wiped out . . . ." Id.
at 54.2 0 Courts do validly indulge in issues classifiable as "collateral" in nature where
their resolution is important Cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)
(whether confession is voluntary); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
(whether evidence legally obtained); Doran v. United States, 205 F.2d 717 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953) (whether child witness had requisite mental
capacity). See also note 24 infra and accompanying text
21 There was some evidence in the case which might tend to show that the
witness-spouse was not under her husband's sway. For example, the jury asked the
trial judge whether it would make any difference if the woman involved had been
an instigator of the plot Instant case at 533 (dissenting opinion). See generally
McCoarmcK, EVIDENCE § 313 (1954).
22 See note 8 .eupra. In Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958), the
Court asserted that it could, "by decision or under its rule-making power, . . .
change or modify the rule where circumstances or further experience dictates."
Id. at 78. Although the rule was applied in that case, the Court cautioned: "this
decision does not foreclose whatever changes in the rule may eventually be dictated
by 'reason and experience."' Id. at 79. But see note 28 infra.
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virtually complete reign over the areas of privilege in the federal system,
2
3
its power to deny the marital privilege in the instant case cannot be ques-
tioned. But the Court's result could have been reached through reasoning
which is less dubious than that actually adopted. Such reasoning would
begin with the question of whether it is desirable to protect-by means of
spousal immunity-the marriage of persons who together have engaged
in the sort of illegal activity which was the subject of the instant case.
The difficult value judgments involved in answering that question have
been faced before: in an analogous situation the Court has refused to recog-
nize the defendant-spouse's privilege where it was found that there was no
marriage to be protected.2 4 And armed with the tenor of the Mann Act's
general policy, the Court might well have concluded that where a man has
violated that statute by prostituting the woman to whom he is married,25
there is no union worthy of judicial protection; in such cases, the interests
of society outweigh any effect on marital harmony. Under this analysis,
the seemingly broad rule of the instant case would be limited to cases in-
volving prostitution or similar offenses; it would not apply to the so-called
"technical" Mann Act violations 2 6 And while marital harmony might
be destroyed in a few cases,27 an analysis based on the premise that most
2
3 While Congress has defined the scope of spousal immunity in regard to certain
specific situations, it has not passed any act defining the privilege as a whole. See
Note, 38 VA. L. Rv. 359, 367 (1952) ; 101 U. PA. L. REv. 700, 701 (1953). It has
also been suggested that Congress, believing that it has delegated the rulemaking
power to the Court, will no longer concern itself with delimitation of the privilege.
See 45 CoRNELL L.Q. 121, 124 (1959).24 Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953) (marriage entered into solely
to defraud the Government). Two district courts have reached the same result.
United States v. Ryno, 130 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 581 (9th
Cir. 1956) (defendant-spouse living with another woman for seven years); United
States v. Graham, 87 F. Supp. 237 (E.D. Mich. 1949) (defendant-spouse fraudulently
obtained wife's property and then deserted her). Ryno and Graham may be reasoned
on the alternate ground of a more liberal interpretation of "direct" offense against
the witness-spouse under the necessity exception. Most courts, however, have doc-
trinarily followed the spousal immunity rule. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States,
358 U.S. 74 (1958) (husband and wife living apart) ; Jackson v. United States, 250
F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1958) (husband and wife separated) ; United States v. Walker,
176 F.2d 564 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 891 (1949) (husband defrauded first
wife and subsequently contracted two bigamous marriages). All of the above cases
involved the defendant's privilege.
25 The Court does speak of the "'shameless offense against wifehood"' in denying
the defendant-spouse's privilege. Instant case at 527. But its reasoning in denying
the witness-spouse's privilege is not limited to cases involving prostitution-type Mann
Act offenses. See note 26 infra and accompanying text.26 E.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (Mormon took one of
his plural wives across state lines) ; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)
(unmarried couple crossed border for purpose of having sexual intercourse).
27 It is not, of course, asserted here that all marriages in which the husband
prostitutes his wife are devoid of marital harmony. What is asserted is that such
marriages are not unions which society should protect through the application by the
judiciary of the exclusionary rule in question. It does not seem unfair to force the
occasional Mann Act offender to appeal to the discretionary prosecuting power when
there is actual marital harmony. And with regard to technical violators, a recent
decision seems to lessen the scope of the Mann Act itself. See United States v.
McClung, 187 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1960), which held that it is not a violation of
the Mann Act to take a woman into another state for the purpose of having sexual
intercourse where fornication is not a crime within that state and where the illicit
activity is not habitual.
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marriages of the type shown in the instant case are unworthy of protec-
tion would avoid more serious problems arising under other possible
resolutions. For example, judicial abstention on the ground that limita-
tion of the privilege is a task for the legislature 2 8 and a consequent literal
adherence 29 to the common-law rule would contravene any interpretation
of Mann Act policy. Nor would it be feasible to have the trial judge assess
in each case the witness-spouse's mental capacity to assert her privilege
independently and without her husband's influence.30 Thus, objection to
the instant case centers not on its particular result but rather on the Court's
means of reaching that result-a means which includes within the rule
established not only the professional procurer but also the "technical"
Mann Act violator.
SALES-DIsm Ru oF IMPLIED WARRANTIS HELD Von AS
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, sued an automobile manufacturer and its
dealer for damages for injuries suffered by the wife-driver in an accident
which resulted from a defective part in an auto sold to the husband by the
defendants. The husband also sued for property damage to the automobile.
In purchasing the auto from the dealer, he had executed a contract of sale,
on the back of which the manufacturer extended an express ninety-day or
4,000 mile replacement-of-parts warranty. The dealer gave the same war-
ranty in an owner's service certificate delivered with the auto.' Both
warranties contained identical disclaimer clauses providing that the obliga-
tion of the manufacturer (or the dealer) was limited to replacement of
parts and that such warranty was "expressly in lieu of all other warranties
28 "It is more properly Congress' business, not ours, to place comparative values
upon the quests for facts in the judicial process as against the safeguarding of the
marriage relationship . . . ." Instant case at 535 (dissenting opinion). See also
Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rulemaking: A Problem in
Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 42 (1958); Riedl, To What Extent
May Courts Under the Rule-making Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J.
601, 604 (1940). Riedl contends that rules of evidence involving general public policy
can be prescribed only by the legislature. The spousal privilege, of course, was
developed by the courts.
29 See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text
30 See note 21 supra and accompanying text. A similar difficulty would be intro-
duced if the trial court had to make a value judgment in each Mann Act case on
the worth of the particular marriage as against the interests of society. But see
Note, 26 NOTRE DAME LAw. 90, 99 (1950); 38 GEO. LJ. 316, 318 (1950). The
avoidance of such complex questions justifies the establishment of a general rule
denying the privilege at the expense of destroying an arguably worthwhile marriage
in rare cases. See note 27 supra. Cf. United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 568
(2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 891 (1949), where, though admittedly
there was no marriage to be preserved, the defendant-spouse was allowed to invoke
the privilege on the ground that the determination of the collateral issue of marital
harmony would unduly complicate other, less clear cases.
'The court concluded that the dealer's warranty was included in the delivered
certificate because the dealer, in the executed contract of sale, had agreed that he
would "promptly fulfill all terms and conditions of the owner's service policy [cer-
tificate]:' Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 407, 161 A2d 69, 97
(1960).
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expressed or implied, and all other obligations or liabilities on its part
. . .. ,2 The wife did not enter into the contract of sale. Plaintiffs based
their claims on two theories-negligence and breach of warranty. The
trial court held that the evidence adduced was not sufficient to make out
a prima facie case of negligence against either of the defendants, but that
plaintiffs could recover on the theory of breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability if it were found that the inclusion in the contract of de-
fendants' disclaimer of such warranty had been unfairly procured. The
jury found for both plaintiffs against both defendants.3 On an appeal
certified before consideration by the Appellate Division, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey affirmed, overruling prior New Jersey law which required
privity of contract in a suit predicated on breach of warranty.4 On the
question of the validity of the attempted disclaimer-which was reached
only after abrogating any need for privity-the court held that, even in the
absence of unfair procurement as required by the court below, the disclaimer
was void as against public policy. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
In those states which require privity of contract before permitting re-
covery on implied warranties, the manufacturer may effectively avoid lia-
bility to the purchaser or consumer by selling through a middleman.5 The
number of such jurisdictions is gradually diminishing; Dean Prosser main-
tains that in those states which have clearly decided the question, the
proponents of the no-privity rule are in the majority-at least in the area
of food products. Moreover, Prosser contends, there is a clear trend
toward extension of the rule into other product areas.8 Recognizing that
there was no reason for differentiating between food and other products,
the court in the instant case held that, as a matter of public policy, an im-
plied warranty of merchantability extended from the manufacturer to the
ultimate purchaser, the husband. The court also held that the wife, al-
though not a party in the chain of sale, could claim under the warranty
inasmuch as she was one of those persons "who in the reasonable contem-
plation of the parties to a warranty might be expected to use or consume
the product sold . . . .2 7 Significantly, the court left open the pos-
2 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 367, 161 A.2d 69, 74 (1960).
3 While direct proof was not adduced as to the cause of the accident, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that "the total effect of the circumstances shown from
purchase to accident is adequate to raise an inference that the car was defective
and that such condition was causally related to the mishap." Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 409, 161 A.2d 69, 97 (1960).
4 E.g., Schlosser v. Goldberg, 123 N.J.L. 470, 9 A.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
5 E.g., Crigger v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S.W. 155 (1915).
Note the discussion of this practice in the instant case at 372-73, 161 A.2d at 77.
6 Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1110-14 (1960).
7 Instant case at 414, 161 A.2d at 100. The trial court had charged the jury
that the warranty was extended to the wife because the husband had purchased the
car as a gift for her. The charge was not prejudicial because the Supreme Court
held that the wife, in any event, could claim under the warranty. Instant case at
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sibility that in the future it might extend warranty protection to persons
other than the purchaser or consumer.8
Despite the court's abrogation of the protective privity requirement, the
dealer and manufacturer could have escaped liability through their dis-
claimer of implied warranties. Although strictly construed because not
looked upon favorably by the courts,9 such disclaimers have the sanction
of the Uniform Sales Act.10  In an analogous field-that of negligence
liability-disclaimers have been more rigorously treated. Thus, agree-
ments limiting the negligence liability of one who owes a duty of service
to the public are generally void as opposed to public policy.:1 The main
415, 161 A2d at 101. The court's rationale for abrogating privity is applicable to
either purchaser or consumer: because the manufacturer placed an automobile on the
market and cultivated its purchase and use by the public, he should be responsible
to the public for any defects which cause injury.8 While the court held that the warranty protection extends to the "purchaser of
the car, members of his family, and to other persons using it with his consent," instant
case at 414, 161 A.2d at 100, it dearly indicates that it is the factual context of the
case which limits its holding. "It is not necessary in this case to establish the outer
limits of the warranty protection." Instant case at 415, 161 A t2d at 101. The
majority of the courts which have abrogated the privity requirement have done so on
two theories: first, that an implied warranty runs with the title to the goods; and
second, that warranty liability is imposed as a matter of public policy. See PROSSmI,
ToRTs 508 (2d ed. 1955). While adherence to either theory allows the purchaser
an action against the manufacturer, the emphasis placed by the title theory upon
some sort of nebulous contractual relationship may be used to deny protection to cer-
tain individuals injured by defective merchandise. While a donee of the purchased
article has been allowed recovery, Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876,
111 So. 305 (1927), others who have not contracted for the purchase of the article
with the manufacturer or his representative, Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d
24 (1949), or who are "strangers to the contract," Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.,
228 F.2d 117, 121 (8th Cir. 1955) (sister of purchaser), have been denied recovery.
Similarly, protection may be denied to those who have made a void contract. See
Grap-ico Bottling Co. v. Ennis, 140 Miss. 502, 106 So. 97 (1925) (Sunday con-
tract). Contra, Anderson v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N.W. 48 (1937). This
result has led some to the conclusion that insistence on a contractual relation is
merely a concomitant of the fictions which courts "have resorted to . . . to ra-
tionalize the extension of the manufacturer's Warranty to the consumer . . . . Such
fictions are not necessary to fix the manufacturer's liability under a warranty if the
warranty is severed from the contract of sale between the dealer and the consumer
and based on the law of torts." Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
465-66, 150 P.2d 436, 442-43 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). See also Prosser,
supra note 6, at 1126-27. For the court's justification for the extension of the war-
ranty in the instant case, see instant case at 414-15, 161 A.2d at 100. Although the
ultimate consumer-e.g., members of the family of the final purchaser-have been
protected as in the instant case, warranty protection has not been extended to the
casual bystander whose only connection with the defective article is that he was
injured by it. See 2 HAI'PER & JAmES, TORTS § 28.15, at 1571-72 & n.6 (1956);
Prosser, supra note 6, at 1142.
9 " 'It is to be remembered that the conditions attached to the warranty are
framed by the seller to limit his liability and restrict the benefit thereof to the buyer.
It is a settled rule that such conditions are to be strictly construed against the party
in whose interests they are made." Henriott v. Main, 225 Ia. 20, 24, 279 N.W.
110, 112 (1938). See VOLD, LAW OF SALEs 444-47 (2d ed. 1959). Note, 23 MINN.
L. R~v. 785 (1939), discusses in detail the various methods used by the courts to
invalidate disclaimers while adhering to basic contract principles.
10 N.J. REv. STAT. § 46:30-3 (1937).
11 Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873) (common carrier);
Housing Authority v. Morris, 244 Ala. 557, 14 So. 2d 527 (1943) ; Oklahoma Natural
Gas Co. v. Appel, 266 P.2d 442 (Okla. 1953) (public utility). But see Manius v.
Housing Authority, 350 Pa. 512, 39 A.2d 614 (1944) (public housing authority).
While a carrier may not completely exculpate itself from the consequences of its
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argument against such agreements-an argument which the New Jersey
court adopted in ruling on the validity of the warranty disclaimer-is that
they are the result of unequal bargaining power: the weaker party, in order
to obtain essential goods or services, must accept the terms of the stronger.
12
Where a duty to the public is not involved, the general rule is that private
parties may contract away their negligence liability;'I however, in recent
years some courts have found that the public's interest in freedom from
exculpatory negligence clauses is not necessarily limited to the narrow
field of public enterprises but can be extended to contracts of a private
nature where one party enjoys a grossly superior bargaining position.
14
In the field of sales, the manufacturer may enjoy a bargaining position
similar to that of public enterprises in that he, in combination with others,
can present a united front as to warranty terms.15 In such a case the buyer,
if he chooses not to accept the warranty offered, is foreclosed from deal-
ing with many or all of the producers of a particular product. Despite the
obvious practical impact of such standardized contracts on the buyer-seller
relationship, the development of the phenomenon has not been generally
recognized by the courts. 16 On the whole, judges have tended to adhere
to the doctrine of freedom of contract, disregarding the absence of the
premise on which the doctrine is grounded-that both parties have entered
into the agreement freely and voluntarily.17 Courts have, of course, been
own negligence, it may limit its liability by offering reduced rates. See The Ansaldo
San Giorgio I v. Rheinstrom Bros., 294 U.S. 494 (1935); PROSSER, op. cit. supra
note 8, at 306. Such a reduction in effect equalizes the bargaining positions of the
parties. See Note, 37 COLum. L. REv. 248, 249-50 (1937).
12 See Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 91 (1955). "The validity
of a particular exculpation contract depends on the whole complex of considerations
bearing on the question whether it is socially desirable to allow escape from liability
in the situation under scrutiny. Consequently, no single element can be relied upon
to explain all the cases. Yet it is interesting to note that exculpation is rarely
allowed where the parties are not on roughly equal bargaining terms." Note, 37
CoLum. L. REv. 248, 249 (1937).
Is Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc., 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953); Hall-Scott Motor
Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 122 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1941); Globe Home Improvement
Co. v. Perth Amboy Chamber of Commerce Credit Rating Bureau, Inc., 116 N.J.L.
168, 182 Adt. 641 (Sup. Ct. 1936) ; RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 574 (1932). Contra,
Cart v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 153 F. Supp. 330 (D. Tenn. 1957) ; Mayers v.
Cities Serv. Oil Co., 148 F. Supp. 199 (D. Wis. 1957); Papakalos v. Shaka, 91
N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941).
14 Mohawk Drilling Co. v. McCullough Tool Co., 271 F.2d 627 (10th Cir.
1959); Fairfax Gas & Supply Co. v. Hadary, 151 F.2d 939 (4th Cir. 1945) (quasi-
public service); Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc., 33 N.J. Super. 575, 111 A.2d 425
(Super. Ct. 1955); Fedor v. Mauwehee Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 21
Conn. Supp. 38, 143 A.2d 466 (Super. Ct 1958) (alternative holding).
15 See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 629, 632 (1943). A 1929-1930 study found that trade asso-
ciations had great influence in determining the type of warranty which should be
extended in the fur, wallpaper, automobile, rug, radio, battery, rubber, jewelry, and
hydraulic industries. Bogert & Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the
Sale of Goods, 25 ILL. L. REv. 400, 407-09 (1930).
36 Kessler, supra note 15, at 632-33.
17 "If there is one thing more than any other which public policy requires, it is
that men of full age and understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting,
and that contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held good and
shall be enforced by courts of justice." Sir George Jessel in Printing Co. v. Sampson,
L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875).
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able to find that such agreements are not binding because of some deviation
from standard contract principles, 18 and it can be inferred that the contracts
do not enjoy judicial favor because courts find them basically unfair. But,
while strict construction may do substantial justice in the individual case,
the stronger party in the future will be able to change the disclaimer's form
while preserving its substance. 19 General dissatisfaction with these evasive
tactics has led one eminent writer to conclude that because traditional con-
tract principles cannot cope with the mass contract, new concepts need to
be developed.20
In the instant case, the New Jersey court points out that the disclaimer
clause in question is standard throughout the automobile industry and in
effect'forecloses the buyer from obtaining redress from the manufacturer
or dealer for personal injuries.21 In direct contravention to the desire
of the manufacturer to contract away his liability is the public policy evi-
denced in the Uniform Sales Act of extending to the buyer the right to re-
cover for injuries resulting from the breach of implied warranties.22 In
answer to the contention that the act itself authorizes disclaimers, the court
said:
The lawmakers did not authorize the automobile manufacturer to use
its grossly disproportionate bargaining power to relieve itself from
liability and to impose on the buyer, who in effect has no real freedom
of choice, the grave danger of injury to himself and others that
attends the sale of such a dangerous instrumentality as a defectively
made automobile.P
18 See note 9 mupra and accompanying text.
'9 "The difficulty with these techniques [strict construction] of ours is threefold.
First, since they all rest on the admission that the clauses in question are permissible
in purpose and content, they invite the draftsman to recur to the attack ....
Second, since they do not face the issue, they fail to accumulate either experience or
authority in the needed direction: that of marking out for any given type of transac-
tion what the minimum decencies are which a court will insist upon as essential to
an enforceable bargain of a given type, or as being inherent in a bargain of that
type." Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. Rzv. 700, 702-03 (1939). As a
pertinent example, trace the history of the standard automobile warranty and its ap-
pended disclaimer through the American courts. In Hardy v. General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 465, 144 S.E. 327, 328 (1928), the court held that a
disclaimer providing that "no warranties have been made by the seller unless endorsed
hereon in writing" did not exclude implied warranties, and in Meyer v. Packard
Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 335, 140 N.E. 118, 120 (1922), a disclaimer to
the effect that "all promises, verbal understandings or agreements of any kind per-
taining to this purchase, not specified herein, are hereby expressly waived" did not
exclude implied warranties. The automobile industry quickly learned the lesson. By
using the magic words "no warranties expressed or implied," the manufacturers and
dealers have managed to avoid any obligation. Kolodzcak v. Peerless Motor Co., 255
Mich. 47, 237 N.W. 41 (1931); Getzoff v. Von Lengerke Buick Co., 14 N.J. Misc.
750, 187 Atl. 539 (Sup. Ct. 1936) ; Glasser v. Dodge Bros. Corp., 11 N.J. Misc. 10,
163 Atl. 121 (Sup. Ct. 1932). Occasionally, however, the manufacturer fails to
include the magic words, and the court administers the coup de grace. See Jarnot v.
Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
20 Kessler, supra note 15, at 632-33, 640-42.
2 Instant case at 390, 161 A.2d at 87.
2 2 Instant case at 404, 161 A.2d at 95.
23 Ibid.
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The court further reasoned that the disclaimer was repugnant to
public policy in that it did not bring to the attention of the buyer the fact
that he was, by its provisions, relinquishing all claims for personal injuries.2
Were this the only ground of the court's holding, it is evident that the
manufacturer, if not hindered by public relations considerations, would be
able to avoid liability in the future by making his disclaimers bold and
explicit. The court's cogent public policy argument, however, and the fact
that it could have merely affirmed the trial court's finding of unfair pro-
curement, leads to the inevitable conclusion that-given the disproportionate
buyer-seller relationship which existed in the instant case-the automobile
manufacturer selling in New Jersey will no longer be able in any manner
to disclaim liability for personal injuries resulting from defective auto-
mobiles.
The result reached is a radical departure in the field of sales and dem-
onstrates a growing judicial concern with the consumer-a concern which
had previously manifested itself in those cases denying to the manufacturer
the protection of the privity requirement. In many instances, abrogating
privity has been sufficient to afford redress to the consumer. In the area
of food products, for example, disclaimers are seldom used. In other
areas, however, the disclaimer is widespread and its use is likely to become
even more common as the number of jurisdictions recognizing the privity
rule decrease. Assuming knowledgeable consent by the buyer, it is ap-
parent that disclaimers should and will be allowed the manufacturer who
operates in a field in which the buyer, if he wishes to do so, can obtain a
more satisfactory warranty; indeed, some such result is required if the
legislative sanction given disclaimers in the Uniform Sales Act is not to be
totally negatived by judicial construction. On the other hand, the manu-
facturer who can, almost with impunity, impose his will on the buyer
should not be allowed the same protection. The ideal resolution of the
consumer-manufacturer conflict on damage resulting from defective con-
struction may lie in legislative prohibition of disclaimers in certain areas.25
In the interim, the instant case offers a solution, and perhaps a criterion,
which is somewhere between absolute liability for all manufacturers,
whether or not they compete as to warranty terms, and the wholly unsatis-
factory no-liability rule which flows from the unhindered imposition of the
disclaimer by those who do not compete.
24 Instant case at 400, 161 A.2d at 93. See also International Harvester Co. of
America v. Bean, 159 Ky. 842, 169 S.W. 549 (1914) (warranty). Compare Doughnut
Mach. Corp. v. Bibbey, 65 F.2d 634, 637 (1st Cir. 1933) (negligence). Such a limita-
tion might have the effect of doing away with disclaimers in the automobile industry
since the clear expression of a desire to avoid liability would create consumer ill will.
On the other hand, since the disclaimer, while explicit, would nevertheless be standard
throughout the industry, the manufacturer might be willing to incur such ill will, since
he would not be faced with competition from other manufacturers as to the terms of
the disclaimer. If such were the holding, the instant case would be subject to the same
criticism which is directed at courts employing the strict construction rationale.2 5 See Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jackson, 287 U.S. 283 (1932) (statute
prohibiting waiver of warranty of fitness on harvesting or threshing machines).
